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LEAGUE CONTROL OF MARKET
OPPORTUNITIES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN THE
SPORTS INDUSTRY
JOHN C. WEISTART*

An issue unsettledfor at least the past decade is the proper characterization of a professionalsports league for antitrustpurposes. Recent
litigation over the efforts of the NationalFootball League to block the
move by the Raidersfrom Oakland to Los Angeles should have been the
occasion for a significantjudicial clarification. The Ninth Circuit decision in the case seeks to limit league discretion and give individual clubs
the right to pursue their separate entrepreneurialadvantage. When subjected to close examination, however, the decision appearsto be premised
on themes that arefundamentally inconsistent. The present articlesuggests that a more coherent view of the antitrustissues in league governance requires that greaterweight be given to the corporate natureof the
league's enterprise. An outcome sensitive to this characteristicis more
apt to satisfy the basic antitrustpolicy of enhancing consumer welfare.
Other antitrust andpublic policy questions remain, but their resolution
should not proceedfrom a conspiratorialview of league governance.
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Insider-OutsiderParadox.

Assume that we are back at a point in time when there is only one
National Football League (NFL) team in Los Angeles. Assume that it
has become clear that the Los Angeles area could support a second football franchise. Assume further that no existing franchise has expressed
an interest in moving into the market. If a prospective owner from
outside the NFL approached the league and were otherwise approved for
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the franchise, could the league make the new owner pay a substantial fee
for the opportunity to operate in Los Angeles? Surely the answer is yes.
The league in effect would be giving up a valuable asset, an asset that was
produced as a result of the efforts of the league's co-venturers. Because
the league has nurtured itself carefully-pursuing sound broadcasting,
franchising, and product development practices-an NFL franchise has
considerable value. And it should be carefully noted that it is not simply
professional football that is so popular, but rather the version offered by
this particular league, the NFL.' The league would be transferring an

important asset of an unmistakable proprietary character, and it should
be able to expect a fair price in exchange. The value of the Los Angeles

franchise in the present market is2 speculative, but a fee of $30-$45 million could probably be defended.
Now change one assumption. Assume that the club seeking the second Los Angeles franchise is not an outsider, but rather an existing club
within the NFL. Can the league impose a similar multimillion dollar

charge for the valuable right that is relinquished? The Oakland Raiders
case-officially captioned Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v.
National Football League 3-seems to say "no." This case suggests that
an exquisite corporate opportunity-an excellent NFL franchise location-can be claimed at no cost by an existing league member. Thus, an
asset which can be sold for a considerable amount to someone on the
outside must be given away to an insider. The general justification for

this result is not readily apparent. And if one looks to the antitrust laws
for an explanation, the paradox is more acute, for it is far from obvious
1. There are, of course, other versions of professional football. The United States Football
League (USFL) presently offers one. In recent memory, the World Football League offered another.
There should be little debate that these other leagues have offered an "opportunity" of a different
magnitude than that available in the NFL. Understandably, then, the value of an NFL franchise is
higher than the alternatives that have recently been available.
2. Reported prices for recent franchise sales include approximately $70 million for the Denver
Broncos in 1984, Sports Indus. News, Mar. 28, 1984, at 56, and approximately $60 million for the
Dallas Cowboys in 1984. Id. See also Guth, Investing in a Pro Team: Expensive, But Worth It, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1980, § 5, at 2, col. 1 (estimating value of Giants and Jets at $59 million and $57
million respectively); N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1982, at B20, col. 2 (Leonard Tose settles suit arising
from his June 17, 1983 agreement to sell 99% interest in Philadelphia Eagles for $42 million). The
figure used in the text is lower than those mentioned here because an established team includes assets
other than the franchise location. On the other hand, a new franchise would be entitled to valuable
rights, including the right to receive more than $10 million a year under the league's television
contract.
3. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984). See also Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd and
remanded, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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how the goals of the antitrust laws-increased competition and increased
consumer choice-are promoted in the one instance but not the other.
This example suggests but one of the several fundamental uncertainties that remain after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Coliseum. The case arose in the wake of the controversy prompted by Al
4
Davis' effort to move his Oakland Raiders franchise to Los Angeles.
The league initially blocked the move under a rule in its constitution,
Rule 4.3, which required approval by fellow owners before one club
could invade another's franchise territory-in this case the territory allocated to the Los Angeles Rams. 5 The Raiders and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission, which stood to gain Davis' team as a tenant, sued,
alleging among other things that the league action violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 6 The claim was upheld in the district court, and in a 24. Background information on the controversy can be found in the following selected sources,
listed here in chronological order: N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1980, at 17, col. 6 (Davis announces move);
Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1980, at D2, col. 1 (Commissioner Rozelle expresses "fear of anarchy");
id., Mar. 11, 1980, at D3, col. 3 (five-member NFL fact-finding committee reports to other owners);
L.A. Times, May 3, 1980, Pt. III, at 1, col. 1 (summary of developments); Nack & Sullivan, Football'sLittle Bighorn?, SPORTS ILLUS., Jan. 26, 1981, at 32, 32 (Rozelle and Davis exchange charges
over alleged ticket-scalping by owners); N.Y. Ti.ies, Apr. 26, 1982, § 5, at 7, col. 1 (rumors of
settlement that would keep Raiders in Oakland and give Davis interest in new franchise in Los
Angeles); Washington Post, May 20, 1981, at Dl, col. 4 (first trial begins); N.Y. Times, May 27,
1981, at B8, col. 1 (testimony of Commissioner Rozelle); id., June 21, 1981, § 5, at 5, col. 3 (testimony of Al Davis); Granelli, The Antitrust Super Bowl, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1981, at 1, col. 2
(summary of legal arguments); N.Y. Times, July 28, 1981, at C13, col. 1 (case sent to jury); id., Aug.
15, 1981, at 17, col. 2 (hung jury; mistrial declared; Davis says one juror who held out was a NFL
"plant"); id., Aug. 29, 1981, at 22, col. 1 (NFL and City of Los Angeles discuss possibility of new
team); id., Mar. 30, 1982, at C12, col. 3 (second trial begins); id., May 9, 1982, § 5, at 1, col. 3
(discussion of jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs); L.A. Times, July 9, 1982, Pt. III, at 1, col. 1 (analysis of Raiders' agreement with Coliseum); id., July 12, 1982, Pt. III, at 1, col. 1 (discussion of $6.7
million non-recourse loan by Coliseum to Davis); N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1983, at B8, col. 4 (damage
phase of litigation begins); id., Apr. 14, 1983, at B17, col. 5 (jury awards more than $16 million
damages to plaintiffs; trebled to more than $49 million); id., May 3, 1983, at B8, col. 5 (Raiders file
new suit against NFL charging obstruction of justice; seeking additional damages of more than $50
million); id., Sept. 14, 1983, at BI 1, col. 4 (court dismisses several counts of obstruction of justice
suit). See also infra note 6.
5. Rule 4.3 originally required unanimous approval of all twenty-eight NFL teams before a
club could relocate into the home territory of another club. After an initial unsuccessful suit by the
Coliseum Commission, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468
F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), the NFL amended Rule 4.3 to lower the voting requirement. Following the change, a move into another club's territory would be approved only if three-fourths of the
teams voted to approve it. When the issue of the Raiders' move into the Rams' territory was put to a
vote, no clubs voted in favor of it, twenty-two voted against it, and five abstained. See Los Angeles
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1385.
6. Sherman Act, § 1, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)). The controversy surrounding the Raiders' move was not confined to the present antitrust
action. The City of Oakland attempted to condemn the franchise under its power of eminent domain. That effort, initially unsuccessful, raised a number of legal issues, including whether intangible rights were subject to condemnation and whether a condemnation action against a sports
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1 decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 7
The decision of the Ninth Circuit has significant implications on

several levels. It of course purports to answer the important immediate
question: can the league control the relocation of its franchises? Beyond
that, though, the decision invites the use of the antitrust laws in judicial
oversight of internal league relationships. The decision will have a good
deal of relevance for the general question of a league's authority to control the conduct of its members.8 Prior to Los Angeles Coliseum, leagues
operated on the assumption that most matters of economic significance
were potentially subject to the joint control of league members, either by
direct vote or through the league commissioners. 9 The majority opinion

in Los Angeles Coliseum can be seen as an initial judicial effort to prompt
a reexamination of that premise. While many league decisions will be
protected by the rule of reason, the majority's decision-if upheld-will

broaden the economic freedom of individual clubs.
It is doubtful, however, whether the majority opinion in Los Angeles
Coliseum presents a coherent view of the limits that exist on the right of
clubs within a league to control the behavior of their co-venturers. A
close review of the majority's analysis reveals fundamental conceptual
franchise was sufficiently imbued with a public purpose. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32
Cal. 3d 60, 64, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676, 646 P.2d 835, 838, vacating 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 646 (1981); Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders
and Poletown?, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 82, 108 (1983) (criticizing failure of California Supreme Court
to set limits on eminent domain power); Note, Taking the OaklandRaiders: A Theoretical Reconsideration of the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation, 32 EmORY L.J. 857, 887-89 (1983);
Note, Eminent Domain Exercised-StareDecisis or a Warning: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
4 PACE L. REv. 169, 192-93 (1983); Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the Parameters of Limitless Power, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 397, 403; Note, California Eminent Domain Statute
Allows the Taking ofAny Type of PropertyInterests- City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 6 WHITTIER L. REv. 135, 138 (1984).
In a 1984 rehearing in the case, an additional issue was raised. A Monterey County Superior
judge again ruled against the City of Oakland, finding that local condemnation of a sports franchise
would unreasonably burden interstate commerce and was thus unconstitutional. See Sports Indus.
News, Aug. 1, 1984, at 128.
7. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), affg 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981). As noted, the issue
of damages was determined in a later trial. The jury's award of damages, when trebled, amounted to
more than $49 million. See supra note 4.
8. A persistent rumor accompanying the Raiders' controversy suggested that Al Davis, the
Raiders' owner, would seek to use the precedent of the case to claim for himself any revenues that
might be generated by local cable or pay-cable television rights. See Antitrust Policyand Professional
Sports: Hearings on H.R. 823, H.R. 3287, and H.R. 6467 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 590 (1981-82)
(testimony of Edward Garvey, Exec. Dir. National Football League Players Association); id. at 63132 (statement of Daniel M. Rooney, owner, Pittsburgh Steelers) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
Such a move, especially if followed by other clubs, could have a significant impact on the value of the
league's network television contract.
9. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.

Vol. 1984:1013]

THE NATURE OF A LEAGUE

1017

tensions. Indeed, there is much to suggest that the majority never is able
to present an adequate explanation of how the inherently cooperative nature of a league venture is to be reconciled with the court's apparent
desire to promote competition among league clubs. A search for alternative grounds for accommodating the need for intraleague cooperation
provides a basis for suggesting that the majority's condemnation of the
league's franchise controls may not be correct.
B.

Background of the Los Angeles Coliseum Litigation.

The legal theory of Los Angeles Coliseum rests on section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The section proscribes concerted action that restrains
competitive opportunities.' 0 There are three relevant antitrust issues in
the Raiders' controversy:
1. Should the league be treated as a single entity incapable of violating section 1?
2. If the league's actions are within section 1, are its rules so inherently anticompetitive as to be subject to per se condemnation, or is the
more deliberative approach of the rule of reason appropriate?
3. If the league's control of franchise moves are to be judged under
the rule of reason, what is the relative balance between the anticompetitive effects of the restraint and any procompetitive justifications that
might be offered for them?
By the time the district court's finding of liability reached the Ninth
Circuit, only the first and third issues remained in controversy. Earlier
proceedings had settled the point that the special characteristics of a
sports league made a summary condemnation under the per se rule
inappropriate. I
Underlying the first issue is the defendants' contention that the relevant "firm" for section 1 purposes is the league and not the individual
clubs that comprise it. 12 Section 1 requires a duality of action before it is
10. The pertinent language of section 1 provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be
illegal." Sherman Act, § 1, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)).
11. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 484 F. Supp.
1274 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds & remanded, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980). The correctness of the choice in favor of the rule of reason approach seems to have been confirmed in the
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984). There
the Court seems to create an industry-wide rule that removes the activities of sports associations and
leagues from the purview of the summary per se approach. The inherent need for internal agreement
and coordination is given as the reason. See id. at 2961.
12. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPoRTs 692-93, 698-701 (1979).
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violated. Only concerted action is condemned. 13 Internal decisionmaking by a single firm is not encompassed by this section, but is left to be
scrutinized under other antitrust provisions, particularly section 2 of the
Sherman Act which proscribes monopolization.1 4 The defendants contended in this case, and in others,1 5 that the economic interdependence of

the league clubs and the agreed-upon procedures for joint control gave
the league the status of a single entity. The league clubs emphasized that

some ninety percent of revenues were shared among the league's members.1 6 In addition, the defendants argued that an important goal of the
league was to insure that member clubs were relatively balanced in terms
of their competitiveness on the athletic field. Dominance by one or few
clubs would substantially diminish the value of the clubs' television offer-

ing and reduce fan interest in live attendance. 17 This need for balance in
the clubs' athletic product was said to warrant an array of equalizing

controls that rendered the league an essentially cooperative venture.18
13. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 19-72 (1981); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 108 (1977).
14. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2742-44 (1984). See
also Areeda, IntraenterpriseConspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451 (1983).
15. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 562 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); North American Soccer League v. National Football
League, 505 F. Supp. 659, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affid in part & rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d
Cir. 1982). See also San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
16. See Los Angeles Coliseum, 762 F.2d at 1390.
17. A point that has never been substantially disputed, even by critics of league practices, is
that the success of a league requires that clubs field teams that are relatively evenly matched in terms
of their playing ability. See Quirk & El Horidi, The Economic Theory of a ProfessionalSports League
in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 33, 34-37 (R. Noll ed. 1974); Glick, Professional
Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act: When and Where Teams Should Be Able to
Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 67 (1983); Kempf, The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to
ProfessionalSports Leagues, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 625, 628 (1983); Rottenberg, The Baseball Player's
Labor Market, 64 J. POL. EcON. 242, 254 (1956); Comment, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act:
Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REV. 418, 421 (1967); Comment,
Application ofAntitrust Laws to ProfessionalSports' Eligibility andDraft Rules, 46 Mo. L. REV. 797,
826 (1981). The need for high quality, balanced competition is confirmed by a review of attendance
statistics. As most sports fans know, a good team playing another good team will draw more fans
than a contest in which a weak team is matched against either a good team or another weak team.
See H. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 11 (1973) (statistical sample
showing a correlation between paid attendance at a particular game and the quality of the teams
involved).
18. The need for on-the-field competitive balance has been asserted as the justification for a
variety of league practices ranging from franchise controls to the draft system and other player
restraints. Although critical of the particular restraints under review, the most authoritative decision
examining the antitrust implications of league controls on player mobility has agreed with the essential point that leagues may properly take steps to equalize the athletic competition that occurs
among clubs. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1976). See
also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("We do not foreclose the
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Thus, in the clubs' view, the league was much like a partnership or corporation, and its actions were not of the sort to which section 1 was
addressed. 19
The third issue assumes that the league is subject to section 1 and
must thus confront a substantive application of the rule of reason. Courts
have long conceded that the language of section 1 condemning "every"
agreement in restraint of trade cannot be applied literally.2 0 Rather, a
rule of reason is used to identify those actions that have some restraining
effect but that will nonetheless be upheld. The meaning of the rule of
reason has been the subject of considerable uncertainty over the years.
For some, the name seems to invite arguments that the restriction in
question is drawn in a "reasonable" or temperate fashion. In recent
cases, however, the Supreme Court has made a concerted effort to clarify
the content of the rule and specifically to dispel the notion that only temperance and reasonableness in the construction of a restraint are required. The Court on several occasions since 1978 has emphasized that
the focus of the rule of reason should be on the competitive conditions in
the relevant market. 2 1 The market must, on balance, be rendered more
competitive as a result of the particular restraint if it is to be upheld.
Restrictions that limit competition must have a strong, countervailing
procompetitive justification to be sustained. 22 And a recent case has revealed that the Supreme Court is prepared to view enhancement of the
possibility that some type of player selection system might be defended as serving 'to regulate and
promote . . . competition' in the market for players' services.").
19. For a more elaborate discussion of the analogy between a partnership and a sports league as
it applies to franchise location, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 699-702. A further
refinement of the analogy is set forth in a subsequent segment of this article. See infra notes 111-33
and accompanying text.
20. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (employing a rule of
reason analysis); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) ("it was intended that the
standard of reason. . . be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a
particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which [Section 1] provided").
21. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978).
22. Most courts view the rule of reason after National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) as requiring an analysis in which the anticompetitive effects of a
restraint are assessed in light of the procompetitive justifications that are put forth. See, e.g., Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1373 (9th Cir. 1983); Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978). This was also the approach endorsed in
the instant case. See Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390-92. For further views on the nature of
the analysis called for under the rule of reason, see P. AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES (Federal Judicial Center 1981); Flynn, Rethinking Sherman
Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposalsfor Reducing the Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593 (1980);
Memorandum of Arnold & Porter to Commissioner of Baseball Re: Problem That Would Arise in
Applying the Rule of Reason to Baseball's Practices and Institutions (Feb. 22, 1982), reprinted in
Hearings,supra note 8, at 439-45.
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competitiveness of a cooperative enterprise vis-a-vis other competitors as
23
procompetitive.
The defendants offered several justifications for franchise controls in
Los Angeles Coliseum. In addition to suggesting that the controls were
merely ancillary to the main venture of producing a league version of
professional football, the defendants contended that the restraints helped
achieve market penetration and regional balance. 24 The league also contended that the controls promoted financial stability among franchises,
and that they encouraged fan loyalty and the cooperation of local
25
governments.
As the outcome of the appellate decision suggests, the league lost on
both its single entity defense and its efforts to secure a favorable review
under the rule of reason. The critical aspects of the Ninth Circuit's rationale are examined in considerable detail below.26 As will be noted, the
court rejected the single entity argument on the grounds that the individual clubs maintained sufficiently distinct identities to preserve their separate relevance for antitrust purposes. Thus an agreement between the
clubs to disapprove the Raiders' move had the requisite duality. 27 The
court believed that this conclusion was supported by the fact that clubs
retained ultimate control of management decisions and ultimate responsibility for profits and losses. The court also feared that recognition of
the single entity defense would exempt the league from antitrust scrutiny
for a wide variety of its activities. Existing case precedent, in the court's
view, supported a refutation of such an exemption.
On the merits of the league's franchise controls, the court accepted
that the league's concerns for regional balance, financial stability, and
community support were cognizable justifications under the rule of reason. It concluded, however, that as applied to the Raiders Rule 4.3
swept too broadly. In the view of the majority, the league had available
less restrictive alternatives for protecting its interests. 2 8 Rather than using a general vote to review the proposed franchise move, the league, in
the court's view, should have used an objective standard that considered
such questions as the adequacy of the population base in the new city, the
23. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961 (1984) (NCAA plays a vital role in
preserving distinctive nature of college football, widening consumer choice, and hence its actions can
be viewed as procompetitive); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979) (hold.
ing that a joint selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase seller's aggregate output
and thus be procompetitive).
24. See Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1396.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
See infra notes 33-66 and accompanying text.
Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387-90.
Id. at 1396-97.
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suitability of the proposed stadium, and the effect of the move on the
marketability of the league games on television. Because the league's disapproval could not be shown to have been based on such considerations,
29
it was rejected and the Raiders' franchise was permitted to move.
29. Under the approach used by the majority, the court announces a legal standard that it does
not have to apply. Because its proposed objective standards were not even considered by the
league-or at least not explicitly so-the court believes that it can conclude that the league's decision
was improper. It is thus left to subsequent cases to determine whether the tests put forth are workable and realistic.
One troublesome feature of the court's approach is the remedy that it affords to the particular
plaintiffs in this case. The Raiders are allowed to move without having to show that their relocation
was consistent with the new objective standards. From the viewpoint of legal policy, it is quite
possible that a different remedial outcome would be preferable. An alternative for the court would
have been to order the league first to devise objective standards and then decide whether the Raiders
met these standards. Such a result would allow the court to hold that the league's decisionmaking
apparatus was defective without requiring the court to reward a potentially inappropriate suitor for
the Los Angeles location.
The point to be made here is more than trivial. The concern for a second franchise in Los
Angeles invites the general question: "But why the Oakland Raiders?" It is possible that the more
sound outcome from the point of view of virtually everyone involved would have been for the Raiders to remain in Oakland and for a new franchise to locate in Los Angeles. If the chance to own the
Los Angeles franchise were made available to others as well as Al Davis, it is likely that several
prospective owners would have appeared. An important policy point is that such an invitation for
an open bidding holds the significant prospect for generating a level of competition that would benefit both the Coliseum Commission and local fans, a result which the majority sought to foster. Of
course, Al Davis as an individual should be allowed to bid on the new Los Angeles franchise. If
successful, he would be required to sell his Oakland franchise to another party.
It is far from clear what the outcome would have been if the majority had asked whether a move
by the Raiders could be justified under the rule of reason standard that it announced. There are
some factors that suggest that it would be preferable both to leave a franchise in Oakland and establish a new one in Los Angeles. Of considerable importance is the fact that the Oakland franchise
was among the most successful in the NFL, both on the field and in its financial affairs. The club had
won the Super Bowl and had been a strong divisional contender in several prior years. Financially,
the franchise was near the top of the league in revenues received. See Hearings,supra note 8, at 380
(statement of William R. Robertson, Commissioner, Los Angeles Coliseum Comm'n); id. at 521
(statement of NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle); id. at 616 (statement of Lionel Wilson, Mayor of
Oakland, Calif.). Fan support had been significant. But while Oakland had been proven to be a
successful location, the Raiders' departure would not necessarily mean that a new franchise could be
located there as easily as it could in Los Angeles. There are several reasons why careful league
planners might be justified in leaving the established franchise intact. While fan loyalty had been
high, a disruptive move by the Raiders most likely would have had an adverse effect. Stated another
way, continuing fan loyalty is likely to be considerably easier than rebuilding it. Moreover, while the
Oakland market had been developed to the point of success, it is a relatively small market, especially
among two-team markets. A new franchise trying to establish itself is likely to experience difficulties
in marketing that would not be encountered by an ongoing franchise. Finally, the departure of the
Raiders leaves the Oakland market vulnerable to claims by competitors, and thus there is a chance
that the market might be lost to the NFL altogether. In fact, a USFL franchise did try to establish
itself following the Raiders' departure. The likelihood that a rival entrant would be a threat to the
NFL would have been reduced significantly if the NFL had been able to maintain its "coverage" in
Oakland.
Some might argue that the court's remedy-allowing the Raiders to move without a showing of
an objective justification-was necessary to achieve other goals of antitrust policy. In the absence of
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Judge Williams' dissent forcefully disputed the correctness of the
majority's conclusion on the single entity issue. For Judge Williams, the
cooperative character of the league suggested that its internal business
decisions did not have the conspiratorial character that is the premise of
the section 1 prohibition. 30 Nor was there a realistic concern that a
wholesale antitrust exemption would be created. Judge Williams could
identify distinctions to be drawn between different types of league activities in terms of their amenability to the single entity characterization. 3'
The balance of this article examines the analytical framework that is
offered in the majority opinion in Los Angeles Coliseum. The evaluation
made here is devoted exclusively to claims raised by the Raiders against
the league. Any potential separate claim of the Coliseum Commission is
not reviewed. There are several reasons for the more confined focus.
First, the claim of the club is the one that has most relevance for other
aspects of league governance. Further controversies most apt to be stimulated by the opinion in Los Angeles Coliseum are those in which individual clubs seek to claim various economic advantages, such as pay
television rights, that might previously have been subject to league control. Second, the legal basis for any claim that a stadium owner might
make is largely derivative. In other words, if it were concluded, in a
particular case or over a wide range of cases, that the league could properly limit the movement of its franchises, it seems unlikely that stadium
the threat of such a significant disruption, it might be contended that the league would have little
incentive to conform its franchise rules to the dictates of the antitrust laws. Such an analysis fails to
give a sufficient accounting of the very imperfect guidance that the antitrust laws have provided on
questions of sports league governance. It is difficult to find much negligence in the league's adherence to its traditional franchising practices. Indeed, the league could well have thought that its
actions were authorized. See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp.
966, 969-71 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (professional hockey league member was not competing in an economic
sense with the league and its other members, so territorial restraints imposed by league did not
violate section 1). See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 694-705.
Moreover, the hypothesized defense of the court's remedy fails to take account of the availability of alternative remedies that hold the prospect of significant potential "punishment" for the
league. For example, even if the Raiders had no ultimate right to move, Al Davis may have suffered
damages as a result of having been denied the opportunity to bid on the Los Angeles location. In
addition, if one accepts other parts of the court's analysis, there may have been other claimants,
including the Coliseum Commission, that had recognizable claims. Finally, the prospect of a generous award for attorney fees plus injunctive relief is likely to provide a significant incentive for a
dissatisfied owner to contest a league's practices.
30. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1404-05 (Williams, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1406 (Williams, J., dissenting). Thus, Judge Williams, unlike the majority, did not
find great precedential value in earlier cases which found that certain league restrictions on player
mobility violated the antitrust laws. While those cases suggested that sports leagues were not entitled to a true entity exemption from section 1, Judge Willliams thought that a principled distinction
could be drawn between the league's rules in question in those cases and intraleague controls intended to regulate the production of the clubs' product of professional football.
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owners would have an independent legal basis for producing a different
result. Questions concerning stadium leases arise only when there is a
prospective tenant with a right to locate in a stadium. When we decide
that the league commits no antitrust offense in foreclosing the availability
of such a tenant, any complaint by a stadium owner seems to be largely
foreclosed. Thus, there is a good deal of value in focusing on the essential question: the right of league members to act collectively to control
32
franchise moves.
II.

THE ESSENTIAL THEMES OF THE COURT'S OPINION:

CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF COMPETITION

A basic contention of this article is that the majority in Los Angeles
Coliseum presents an unsatisfactory appraisal of the role of competition
in the sports industry. Once a more coherent view of the potential for
competitive behavior is developed, the correctness of the result reached
by the court is rendered doubtful. To illustrate the error in the majority's conceptualization of the case, we will, for the moment, step away
from the court's technical legal analysis and examine the broader themes
of its opinion. The court's view of a league's right to limit a club's effort
to pursue its own economic advantage will be particularly scrutinized.
For the present discussion, no effort is made to suggest whether it is the
single entity defense or the rule of reason analysis that is most affected.
As will be seen, when the inherent difficulty in the court's analysis is
corrected, the proper outcome can plausibly be accommodated under
either doctrine.
One unmistakable implication of the majority's decision is that the
league may not always claim to itself-or more precisely, to its collective
32. The majority's treatment of the Coliseum Commission's claims in Los Angeles Coliseum is
somewhat curious. In a preliminary discussion intended to identify the relevant market for the
balance of its analysis, the court defines a separate market for sports stadium tenants. 726 F.2d at
1394. The court indicates that the stadium owners and the Raiders' owners have distinctive potential claims under the antitrust laws. However, when the court considers the substantive aspects of
the rule of reason on the facts before it, it does not elaborate on the separate issues that might arise in
connection with the claim of the stadium owner. Most of the factors mentioned by the courtpopulation size, fan loyalty and so on-are relevant only to the general question of whether a club
will be allowed to relocate from one area to another. While a stadium owner's claim would be
affected by those elements, there are other concerns that are more distinctively related to the suitability of a particular stadium-its size and location, for example. The court's failure to develop the
substantive aspects of the stadium owner's separate claim thus leaves the analysis somewhat incomplete. The omission does, however, tend to reinforce the conclusion offered in the text that the
antitrust rights of stadium owners are largely derivative. Once we know that a stadium is of adequate size and location, and is otherwise suitable-as it was in Los Angeles Coliseum-the primary
antitrust issues remaining are those that concern the propriety of the league's decision to limit the
movement of the club in question.
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membership-economic opportunities that could be captured by one of
its individual members. Indeed, parts of the opinion suggest that all
league actions should be judged from the premise that individual clubs
within a league are independent businesses and are free to pursue their
own economic advantage, subject to a carefully circumscribed right of
the league to impose limited controls. The acceptable controls are those
compelled by necessity, specifically the necessity of joint league action to
schedule games, foster a league race, and insure the economic viability of
the component parts. In framing the broad issue before it, for example,
the majority perceives that it must decide whether a group of businessmen can interfere with a co-venturer's "right to do business where he
pleases." ' 33 Although not examined in further detail by the court, this
statement assumes as a premise that entrepreneurial autonomy is the natural state and that any different arrangement requires specific justification. In a similar vein is the majority's later statement that
[t]o withstand antitrust scrutiny, restrictions on team movement
should be more closely tailored to serve the needs inherent in producing the NFL34 "product" and competing with other forms of
entertainment.
Again, the suggestion is that proper league controls are confined to satisfying certain limited "inherent" needs and then only if the relevant rules
are carefully confined. The remainder of economic opportunity is, by
implication, to be left to be captured by individual clubs. Further, on the
now-critical question of whether there is sufficient reason for collective
control, the Ninth Circuit majority seeks objectification. The court
found offensive the NFL procedure that allowed member clubs to cast
raw, unexplained votes on the issue of franchise moves. In the court's
view, the need for choosing the least restrictive alternative and thus minimizing the restraint on individual owner prerogatives required the league
to draw its decision as carefully as possible, and that implied the need for
standards such as relative population size, television marketing effects,
and so on, against which the proposed move would be judged.
As an aside, it can be noted that the model of league decisionmaking
that this view presumes is much different from that which has operated
in the past. Legal rules gave league participants little reason to confine
collective decisions on matters relating to the development of franchises
and the dispersal of the economic rewards therefrom. Most leagues assumed that they had authority to prohibit the relocation of existing
33. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1391 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1397.
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franchises, 35 to deny transfers of ownership, 36 to decline to add new
clubs, 37 to assess "compensation" when one club was allowed to invade
another's territory, 3 8 to compel the sharing of gate receipts and broadcast
revenues, 39 and in a few cases, to compel collective financial support for
individual franchises. 4° Which, if any, of these actions will now be allowed is subject to considerable debate. For present purposes, it is
enough to note that there is an important conceptual shift if it is true that
entrepreneurial opportunities belong to individual clubs, subject only to
35. See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 968 (C.D. Cal.
1974); see also Hearings,supra note 8, at 517 (statement of NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle concerning NFL effort to forestall move by Baltimore Colts); N.Y. Times, May 19, 1983, at B17, col. 5
(National Hockey League (NHL) blocks sale and move of St. Louis Blues to Saskatoon). For a
discussion of franchise moves in baseball, which are probably exempt from antitrust scrutiny because
of baseball's exemption, see Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in ProfessionalSports,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 1973, at 42, 49-52.
36. See Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also
Comment, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws,
81 HARV. L. REV. 418, 426-30 (1967). Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1982, at A17, col. I (proposed sale of
Seattle SuperSonics to company which manufactures slot machines to be reviewed by National Basketball Association (NBA)); Washington Post, May 20, 1983, at D5, col. 3 (among reasons for NHL
disapproval of move of St. Louis Blues to Saskatoon is prospect of public ownership of franchise).
37. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 561 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aft'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Hearings,supra note 8, at 273-82 (testimony of
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle concerning league expansion policies).
38. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1982, at A17, col. 1 (Colorado Rockies pay $12.5 million compensation to New York Rangers, New York Islanders, and Philadelphia Flyers in connection with move
to New Jersey); id., July 27, 1977, at Al, col. 1 (NBA Nets paid $4 million "compensation" to New
York Knicks when the Nets moved to New Jersey).
39. As previously noted, the NFL has historically engaged in extensive revenue sharing. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text. Practices in other leagues vary. While the NFL shares gate
receipts 60-40, there is no gate sharing in basketball and a modest sharing in baseball. The totally
equal division of national television revenues in the NFL is followed in baseball, but in the latter
sport local broadcast revenues, a significant source of revenue, are not shared. Basketball divides a
modest national television contract equally, but also does not share important local revenues. See
Hearings, supra note 8, at 66-69 (testimony of Gerald W. Scully); J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ,
BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 89-93 (1981); Noll, The U.S. Team Sports Industry:

An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 17, at 1, 13-29.
The NBA appears to be prepared to endorse an arrangement of direct cross subsidization that is
more venturesome than traditional forms of revenue sharing. See infra note 80.
40. Frequently such support is required to assist franchises that encounter financial difficulty.
See Sports Indus. News, May 23, 1984, at 87 (USFL assumes control of Chicago Blitz franchise;
seeks settlement with creditors); L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1975, Pt. III, at 4, col. 1 (WFL members
assessed to support Portland franchise). The internal league subsidy may also take the form of a
belated agreement to subordinate league debts to those of other creditors, as happened in the NBA.
See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1977, at D15, col. 1 (NBA agrees to extend time for payment of entry fee
by clubs that previously came from American Basketball Association (ABA); also agrees to
subordinate debt). A related type of collective support is seen in the decision of the twelve owners of
the then-recently formed World Hockey Association (WHA) to share the cost of the bonus paid to
Bobby Hull to jump from the NHL to the Winnipeg franchise in the WHA. See Quirk & El Horidi,
The Economic Theory of a ProfessionalSports League, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BusINESS, supra note 17, at 33, 41.
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league controls arising from necessity. Just as unfettered league control
of franchise moves could no longer be presumed under the view put forth
in the majority opinion, neither could the league be assured that the collective control over gate receipts, broadcast revenues, and ownership
41
transfers would fall beyond judicial review.
The court's urging of greater economic freedom for individual clubs
permeates its substantive antitrust analysis. In the court's view, a finding
of liability requires a showing that there is "'(1) an agreement among
two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended to
harm or unreasonably restrain competition; (3) and which actually
causes injury to competition.' ",42 The court, of course, found that each
element was satisfied. What exactly was the "competition" that was injured? For the majority, the NFL rule produced an injury to competition in the local market for NFL football. In other words, the court
accepted-or more precisely, found that there was sufficient evidence for
the jury to accept-that the relevant geographical market was the local
market, that the relevant product was NFL football, and that competition among NFL teams would be enhanced if Rule 4.3 were invalidated.
The court made clear the policy goal it hoped to achieve by applying the
antitrust laws in this case. It had a concern for monopoly pricing. Indeed, for the majority, the matter was rather simple:
[t]he competitive harms of Rule 4.3 are plain. Exclusive territories insulate each team from competition within the NFL market, in essence
allowing them
to set monopoly prices to the detriment of the consum43
ing public.
What the court envisages, apparently, is that the introduction of a competing team in Los Angeles will force each club to compete for fans and
hence will lead to competition in ticket pricing, which, the court believes,
will produce lower prices and avoid those despised monopoly profits. 44
At a superficial level, this pursuit of the free market meshes nicely
with the court's view of the right of clubs to capture entrepreneurial opportunities. The market will be free only if the actors are free, and this is
achieved only by the careful confinement of centralized league control.
Thus, the league's authority must be restrained to allow the benefits of
competition to flow to consumer-fans.
41. See supra note 8.
42. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1391 (quoting Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286,
290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980)).
43. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395.
44. The majority promotes a similar theme earlier in the opinion when it asserts that cartel
behavior by owners should be condemned. The justification for such condemnation is that cartel
behavior enables competitors "to charge unreasonable and arbitrary prices instead of setting prices
by virtue of free market forces." Id. at 1392.
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Upon closer examination, however, a substantial question arises as
to whether the goal of increased competition among NFL clubs provides
a satisfactory rationale for pervasive limits on joint decisionmaking by
the clubs comprising a professional sports league. When probed, the
court's notion of "competition" seems at best incomplete and at worst illconceived. 45 Indeed, the court itself seems to abandon the model of internal competition when it considers the league's justifications for its
actions.
No small part of the difficulty with the court's opinion arises because the majority treats each of the elements of an antitrust offense discretely. The matter of identifying the local market as the relevant one is
undertaken without regard to the substantive antitrust treatment of
league franchise controls. The former is discussed and the virtues of
"competition" are extolled early in the opinion and the latter is taken up
much later. There is no serious attempt to intertwine these bedrock
46
issues.
Unfortunately, the issues cannot be segmented so neatly. The
court's later analysis does agree that leagues can exercise control over
franchise locations. Particular attention must be given to the goals that
the court concedes can be pursued by a league as it asserts its collective
interest. Of critical importance is the court's acceptance that a proper
goal of league franchise controls is to insure the financial stability of the
clubs involved. The court recognized that such stability both promotes
on-the-field competition and is important to the economic interests of
other venturers:
We agree that the nature of NFL football requires some territorial restrictions in order both to encourage participation in the venture and
to secure each venturer the legitimate fruits of that participation ...
Exclusive territories aid new franchises in achieving financial stability,
which protects the large initial investment an owner must make to
helps ensure no one team
start up a football team. Stability arguably
47
has an undue advantage on the field.
45. The court's analysis may also be wrong as a matter of economics. There is respectable
authority to suggest that intraleague competition has little if any effect on ticket prices. One study
found that ticket prices were not substantially lower in multiteam cities. See infra note 54. Such a
finding in the context of Los Angeles Coliseum would, of course, substantially undermine the pivotal
premise of the majority's analysis.
46. The majority states that it regards the question of the relevant market to be related to the
question of the nature of the entity involved. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1394. The court
also states that the ultimate question of legality subsumes both issues. Id. The opinion, however,
fails to recognize that the concessions ultimately made to league control significantly limit, if not
eliminate, the prospects of traditional competition between two clubs in the same city.
47. Id. at 1396. Some might find significance in the fact that the majority only refers to "new
franchises" in its first reference to financial stability. There is, however, no serious basis for sug-
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What the court apparently fails to appreciate is that the collective
concern for the financial stability of individual franchises is at odds with
its assumption that there will be free and robust competition. References
to a "free market" 48 and "monopoly prices" 49 reflect premises that are
fundamentally inconsistent with those that underlie a recognition of the
financial interdependence of league members. As eventually characterized by the court, the law seems not to require that two franchises be
established as fierce competitors. Indeed, it appears that a portion of the
relevant market may be assured to each. 50 Thus there are considerable
grounds for doubting the extent to which the prerogatives of individual
clubs have been enhanced.
The tension between a league's concern for financial stability and a
call for increased competition warrants elaboration. The recognition of
the clubs' mutual interest in the financial stability of each club should
mean that a league can decline to locate a franchise in any area in which
it appears that available fan support would be inadequate. This should be
true whether the proposed franchise is the first, second, or third for the
particular area. In the same vein, the court's analysis presumably allows
the league to insure that there will be enough fans to support each new
franchise. 5' If there are sufficient fans to support one but not two
franchises, then-under the court's rationale-the league would be required to locate only one club in the area. And before two are required,
it must be clear that there are enough fans to provide support for each.
In effect, each franchise is allowed an assured fan base. A structure that
accepts this fact is considerably different from the free market that the
majority loosely espouses.
In fact, because the fan base in particular locales will never precisely
equal the number reasonably needed to support a given number of
franchises, there will usually be more than enough potential fans to support the franchises that are assigned. Put in simple terms, if a successful
football franchise requires a population base of at least x, then a city with
gesting that the concern for the relationship between financial stability and on-the-field competitiveness is relevant only to new franchises.
48. See supra note 44.
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50. In addition to giving its approval to the use of some type of territorial restriction, the majority lists the objective factors that it believes should control the decision. Among these are "population, economic projections, facilities, regional balance, etc." Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1397.
While the majority gives no detailed elaboration, the references to population and economic projections presumably are intended to suggest that a move would not have to be approved if the population base were insufficient to support the additional franchise or if the economic projections were
negative.
51. See supra note 50.
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a population of 1.5x will be allocated only one franchise, which will enjoy
a substantial cushion of additional potential patrons.5 2 And in an area
with a population of 2.75x, a league presumably needs to award only two
franchises, with the additional .75x population providing an excess of
fans for each club.
The success of a particular franchise, of course, will depend on a
variety of factors in addition to the size of its fan base. The overall quality of the league product, the astuteness of club decisions with respect to
personnel, and the availability of entertainment alternatives will all substantially affect whether the franchise succeeds. But even with the financial uncertainty that is introduced by these factors, the essential point
remains: under the majority's concession, a league will never be required
to put two of its franchises in a locale in which one will operate from a
position of substantial weakness. Subject to the uncertainties inherent in
any business planning and subject to subsequent developments that
might diminish the commercial viability of the planned athletic competition, a league presumably can make its franchise allocation decisions on
the assumption that each franchise is entitled to an assured, protected
3
market.5
The point, again, is that if the court's eventual analysis of league
interests is correct, there is not likely to be a free market for NFL football. The latter view suggests that the league can regulate the award of
franchises to insure that other league goals-specifically the financial stability of each individual club-is not undermined. The decisionmaking
process, permitted by the concession in the majority opinion, will be one
52. A surprisingly durable notion among courts and legal commentators considering franchising issues is that there is a definable minimum population base necessary to support a sports
franchise. See, e.g., American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60, 76 (D.
Md. 1962), affd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963); Glick, supranote 17, at 92; Kurlantzick, Thoughts on
ProfessionalSports and the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 15 CONN. L. REV. 183, 206 (1983); see also Sports Antitrust Reform Act,
H.R. 2129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Presumably that number varies from sport to sport and
changes over time with variations in the cost of operating a franchise and the popularity of the
particular league's product.
One study that attempted to quantify the relationship between population and other variables in
their effect on baseball attendance found, not surprisingly, that the size of the population base is
perhaps the most important consideration in a club's financial success. But it is also not surprising
that the relative success of the team and the number of star players on its roster were found to have a
significant effect on total attendance and ultimate profitability. Nonetheless, a team with modest onthe-field success is likely to do better financially in a city with a large population base rather than a
small one. See Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS,
supra note 17, at 115, 120-30; see also J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 39, at 67-73.
53. Again, this is a notion that is accepted by most commentators, including those who would
subject league franchise decisions to more exacting judicial scrutiny than is advocated in this article.
See Glick, supra note 17, at 92; Kurlantzick, supra note 52, at 196.
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that emphasizes the need to protect each franchise from ruinous competition. This is obviously a much different notion than that which earlier
prompts the court to condemn "monopoly prices" and demand "free
market" behavior.
What causes this difficulty in the majority's treatment of the case? A
major conceptual hurdle for the majority-and for many commentators
dealing with sports-related antitrust issues-is the prospect of some competition for fans between two clubs located in the same geographical
area. The potential for such occasional competition is frequently seized
upon as the lodestar for an antitrust analysis. Seldom is consideration
given to the more basic issues of whether such competition is merely
transitory and whether it might be largely irrelevant for antitrust purposes.5 4 Unfortunately, the prospect that under some circumstances two
clubs might, contrary to their preferences and to the predominant interest of their fellow venturers, attempt to sway the allegiance of local fans
has had a decided diversionary effect. Not infrequently attention is
drawn away from an analysis of the predominant and most enduring
characteristics of the league's venture. And as is illustrated by Los Angeles Coliseum, the discussion sometimes ignores the inevitable need for
reconciling the potentiality of competition with the league's ultimate
right to insure its own financial stability.
54. Surprisingly absent from the court's analysis in Los Angeles Coliseum is any reference to the
significant work done by academic economists who have looked at the sports industry. One of the
more interesting studies was done by Professor Jesse W. Markham of the Harvard Business School
and Paul V. Teplitz of the Cambridge Research Institute. J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note
39. While Markham and Teplitz focused on professional baseball, much of their analysis has relevance for other leagues. Their observations about the role of local competition raise a substantial
doubt about the correctness of the court's approach:
While clubs constituting a league compete with one another for league standing, they do
not, because of the geographical nature of the "market," compete for customers. . . . This
is not meant to imply that absolutely no competition for customers exists among majorleague clubs. The four large metropolitan areas supporting two or more clubs may be
characterized by a certain amount of interclub competition for patronage and fan loyalty.
Moreover, the network telecast of a major-league game may compete with a hometown
game played on the same day. The essential point, however, is that such fringe competition
is not likely to affect the decision making of individual clubs in such matters as ticket
prices. Thus, ticket prices are likely to be determined not by competition with other clubs
but by competition with alternate uses of people's leisure time, such as television, going to
the beach, or puttering around the yard. The revenues earned by a club with any given
home game are determined much more by its own league standing and its relative standing
with the visiting team than by any independent competitive commercial strategy it may
adopt against other teams in its league. . . . In economic terms, the price cross-elasticity
of demand among games played in different home parks is extremely low-in fact, in most
cases it is virtually zero.
Id. at 23-24 (footnote omitted). The authors also noted that "price competition does not occur to any
great extent in multiteam cities. Ticket prices for such teams are not significantly different from
prices charged by other teams." Id. at 23 n.12.
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There are several difficulties with this view of the role of "competition." One is the lack of perspective in the view taken of the competition
that may occur. What is missing from Los Angeles Coliseum is an appreciation of the extent to which economic competition among clubs is an
incidental and usually avoidable aspect of the league's economic venture.5 5 It is certainly not inevitable. Presumably each local team would
prefer sold-out stadiums; and as we noted, the league presumably could
structure its affairs to foster this result, for the league need not purposely
allocate a franchise to an inadequate population base. Because the
league's planning cannot be precise, however, and because the local
franchises are subject to dynamic economic forces, competition for fans
may develop from time to time in a two-franchise city. But the occasional and incidental competition that results should not-and indeed,
cannot-become a goal of legal policy if recognition is given to the more
56
basic interdependent characteristics of the league.
The point here can be underscored by reference to extreme examples
of interclub competition. Imagine the case in which significant competition developed between two football franchises in a given locale. Assume
that it intensified to the level that one franchise was able to attract a
significant number of fans from the other, and the financial fortunes of
the latter were jeopardized. In most business settings, we would accept
this as a necessary, and frequently desirable, consequence of the free market, because some deficiency in the weakened franchise had been exposed. The situation, however, is likely to be viewed differently in the
sports context. Presumably, consistent with its goal of preserving each
55. Another contextual point ignored in Los Angeles Coliseum is that, over the history of professional sports, two-team cities have rather persistently been the source of financial concern for the
leagues involved. Thus, the league's actual experience stands in some contrast to the benefits that
the majority implies will flow from having more such competition. The experience in Boston, St.
Louis, and Philadelphia in baseball and in Chicago, Baltimore-Washington, and San Francisco-Oakland in football should suggest that economic stability and dual league representation are often difficult to sustain over time. See, e.g., Quirk, supra note 35, at 47-63. Hence, the league's concern for
the financial implications of a two-team locale does not seem to be a matter that can be trivialized. In
the same vein, the supposed benefits of competition are likely to be transitory in many locales.
56. This raises the legitimate question of what issue of legal policy is presented by Los Angeles
Coliseum if it is not a question of increased competition. As a later portion of this article suggests,
see infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text, the real issue may not be whether we should encourage
more local competition between franchises, but rather whether there is an inadequate penetration of
the market for franchises by the NFL. As will be indicated, the latter question arises even in cities in
which only one franchise can be supported and which thus offers no significant prospect of "local
competition." It will be suggested that section 2, rather than section 1, of the Sherman Act may
have the more significant implications for market penetration. See id. An alternative view is that the
market for professional sports franchises has structural imperfections and may require a legislative
solution. The present discussion accepts that there are market imperfections, but does not undertake
to consider the legislative responses that might be appropriate.
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member's financial stability, the clubs within the league would be permitted to intervene and save the weakened franchise from ruin. There must,
of course, be corporate authorization for such action, but as far as the
antitrust laws are concerned-even in the majority's ultimate analysisthere appears to be no principle that requires the co-venturers to sit by
and accept the worst consequences of interclub competition.
There is a second conceptual weakness that results from the court's
attempt to use "competition," particularly "local competition," as the
justification for its effort to decentralize the governance of professional
sports. An apparent theme of the opinion is that league control is to be
circumscribed, and individual clubs are to be presumed to have the right
to capture available entrepreneurial advantages. Yet there is very little
potential for "local competition" within the NFL, or indeed in most professional leagues. In the NFL, the norm is the single franchise city. At
present, "local competition" in a meaningful respect can occur in only
two locales, Los Angeles-Orange County and New York-New Jersey.
Thus, while the court purports to announce a reform that would have
league-wide effects, the premise from which it operates appears quite incapable of supporting such a broad conclusion. In fact, in the typical
NFL city, restrictions on the extent of franchise controls may have effects contrary to those which the court thought it was pursuing. A single
location franchise presumably could use its new freedom to exact further
profits-or as the court says, "monopoly prices"-from local fans. This
might, for example, take the form of an effort to assert control over local
' 57
distribution of the broadcast of the team's "away games."
In terms of developing a coherent antitrust policy, the difficulty here
is more than trivial. If the subject city in Los Angeles Coliseum were not
Los Angeles, but rather Phoenix, Memphis, Indianapolis, or another locale that was previously unoccupied but capable of supporting only a
single NFL team, it is not obvious that a section 1 theory would have
protected the Raiders' move. Section 1 is intended to proscribe conduct
that limits competition. If the relevant market is local and if the particular locale in question can sustain only a single franchise, it is quite uncer57. There is another potential irony that might be noted. The move by the NFL Colts from
Baltimore to Indianapolis occurred after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Coliseum,
While the precise impact of that case on the NFL decisionmaking cannot be known by an outsider, it
appears that the league's decision not to challenge the move was influenced by the prospect of further antitrust liability premised on the Ninth Circuit precedent. See Sports Indus. News, Apr. 11,
1984, at 59. It should be noted, however, that the Colts moved from an area of potential local
competition-Baltimore-Washington-to a city where the team will enjoy a virtual monopoly.
Thus, a case that supposedly seeks to save fans from the vice of "monopoly prices" seems to have
had the opposite effect. See also L.A. Times, July 31, 1984, Pt. III, at 1, col. 2 (Colts offer 52,000
season tickets; receive orders for 143,000).
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tain how a league bar to relocation would reduce competition among

producers of NFL football.5 8 Again, it appears that the majority in Los
Angeles Coliseum expects a modest notion of "local competition" to pro59
vide the foundation for a concept that has overpowering dimensions.
But without this premise, there is little antitrust substance in the alleged
section 1 offense.

A final weakness in the court's notion of competition is related to
the first criticism raised above. In castigating monopoly profits and ex-

tolling the "free market" in the first portion of the opinion, the court
apparently believes that it is conforming sports to the consumer welfare
model of antitrust. That model assumes that consumers will benefit from

more economic competition and well-rewarded competitors.60 In the peculiar economics of professional sports, however, that is not the case, at

least not at the level of intraleague relations. There is a need for balance
and equality in playing strength among league franchises.6 1 Without

some centralized control, the economic success-or failure-of one or
several clubs can significantly reduce the value of the product that is offered. The real "product" is not one that any single team controls, 62 but
58. This issue has a potentially significant effect on the precedential impact of the Los Angeles
Coliseum decision. If protection of local competition is an inherent part of the court's rationale, then
it is not clear how the case could be used to review a league decision to prevent a team from relocating to a city that could support only a single franchise. The subsequent move of the Colts from
Baltimore to Indianapolis raises this concern. See supra note 57.
59. In one passage, the majority puts forth its view that NFL clubs compete for "players,
coaches, and management personnel." LosAngeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390. Some might suggest
that it is this competition that provides a rationale to sustain a section 1 review even in cases involving a move to a single team city. It might be suggested that movement of a club may enhance its
ability to compete for these various types of employees. The court, however, does not utilize this
theory and it is debatable whether any plaintiff in Los Angeles Coliseum had standing to raise the
concerns of the parties identified. Moreover, any serious pursuit of such an approach would have to
confront the fundamental question whether these other parties are so significantly affected by the
location of a franchise as to outweigh the justifications for giving the league broad discretion to
control franchise movements. The presence of separate markets for the various types of employees
should raise doubts as to whether the relative profitability of a single competitor will have an appreciable effect on the prices paid for their services.
60. That the goal of consumer choice is to be the guiding principle in American antitrust law
was reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2963-65
(1984).
61. The notion that balanced on-the-field competition is important to the success of a sports
league is now generally recognized among courts and commentators, even those strongly critical of
traditional league practices. A sampling of the sources that would support this conclusion can be
found supra notes 17-18.
62. Both the district court and the court of appeals in Los Angeles Coliseum assert that each
team within a league offers a separate product. 519 F. Supp. at 583; 726 F.2d at 1388. This conclusion is contrary to a substantial body of economics literature. The joint nature of the sports product
involved in a league game has long been recognized. See, e.g., H. DEMMERT, supra note 17, at 10; J.
MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 39, at 19-20; Neale, The PeculiarEconomics of Professional
Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 (1964).
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rather is that which results when teams from other clubs appear in a
structured athletic contest which is part of a larger league race. Thus,
even were one team to gain a significant advantage over others, through
control of television receipts or by some other means, that does not tell
enough to allow us to conclude that consumer welfare has been advanced. What is necessary is an additional appraisal of the final product-both the local team's contribution to it and the level of
competitiveness of the visitor. Such analysis may well make one skeptical that consumers will always prefer the results of increased autonomy.
If what fans find attractive is not merely the offering of the local team,
but rather an intense, sustained competition in which local teams participate, then presumably the fans' interest is furthered by rules that lead to
63
equalization rather than imbalance.
The majority opinion eventually recognizes this point when it discusses the substance of the rule. 64 But the failure to reconcile the demand for increased competition and the recognition of the value of
league control is of fundamental importance. If it is in fact true that a
misdirected model of consumer welfare is used to sustain the court
through its discussion of the desirability of increased competition, then
the later discussion of the substantive impact of the rule of reason may
have been unnecessary. In fact, a finding that the competition to be protected was not that which occurs between two local NFL teams, but
rather the competition that exists between the NFL and other forms of
entertainment, would have brought the opinion to a quick conclusion. 65
So, what exactly does Los Angeles Coliseum mean? Ultimately one
cannot be sure. The majority attempts to strike a blow in favor of greater
entrepreneurial prerogatives for individual member clubs within a league.
Its pronouncement, however, suffers from both an imperfect premisethe overstated utility of inter-club competition-and a conclusion that is
As explained in more detail below, the court's assertion that each team produces a singular
product also proceeds from a highly doubtful legal assumption about a club's ability to control its
own assets. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
63. In addition to the economic commentaries that support this view, see supra note 62, the
essential point about the need for equalization of playing strength has received wide recognition in
the decided cases. See, e.g., North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d
1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976);
Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 720
F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
64. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1396.
65. In undertaking to identify the competition most relevant for antitrust purposes, some attention should have been given to the view put forth by Markham and Teplitz that in two team cities,
ticket prices are less apt to be influenced by interteam competition than by other considerations such
as the availability of entertainment alternatives. J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 39, at 2324. This finding adds weight to the view put forth in the text. See also supra note 54.
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contradicted by the court's own recognition of the need for financial stability in individual franchises. If a showing of a promotion of local competition is needed each time a club claims an entrepreneurial advantage,
then the precedential value of the case may be quite limited. 66 There is,
though, another possibility, ana that is that the basic thrust of the case
needs reexamination.
III.

ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST THEORIES:

AN

OVERVIEW

The preceding analysis of Los Angeles Coliseum has identified the
essential weakness of the majority opinion: the outcome supposes an enhancement of competition among league clubs, but it is extremely doubtful that such competition will occur if the league is permitted to pursue
other goals seemingly accepted by the court, particularly the goal of insuring the financial strength of the league's constituent members. There
is thus an apparent and significant flaw in the court's analysis. The question naturally arises, then, as to what would be a more appropriate legal
theory to apply to the facts before the court.
This question invites several responses. At a preliminary level, there
are grounds to suggest that there is no section 1 violation in Los Angeles
Coliseum and that the result reached is therefore incorrect. A premise of
section 1 is that there are competitors which, but for the disputed restraint, would be enhancing consumer welfare through competition. If
this supposition does not provide an adequate justification for prohibiting
league control of franchise moves, then section 1 seems not to offer a
proper basis for liability. Some may observe, however, that the objection
still remains that the NFL has not provided football fans with as many
local franchises as they might be willing to support. 67 Under this approach, doubts about the appropriateness of section 1 do not answer the
basic concern.
The complaint about incomplete market development by the NFL
may be closer to the concerns that underlie section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 68 rather than section 1. Section 2 proscribes improper market domi66. See supra note 57.
67. Professor Roger Noll of the California Institute of Technology has provided the economic
analysis that suggests why this might be so. See Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 17, at 115, 141-46. See also Hearings,supra note 8, at
163-64 (letter from Roger G. Noll). Others have agreed that the market for sports franchises is not
one controlled by the normal competitive forces and may require some form of public regulation.
See Quirk, supra note 35, at 64-65.
68. The prohibition of section 2 extends to "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Sherman Act, § 2, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
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nation by a single actor. A critical premise of the provision is that abusive exercises of monopoly power must be regulated through legal
institutions because the normal pressure of market forces will be insufficient to insure that consumer welfare is advanced. Viewed from the perspective of section 2, the complaint against the NFL is that it enjoys a
near-monopoly position in professional football and its dominant market
position limits its incentive to satisfy all the demand that might exist for
69
additional franchises.
The relevance of section 2 concerns must not be overlooked. Assume that the NFL had organized itself in a different fashion. Specifically, let us assume that prior to the Los Angeles Coliseum litigation, the
NFL was organized as a formal partnership and that the parties had
traditional partnership attributes-they shared profits and losses, participated equally in decisionmaking, and were governed by a pervasive collective authority. Such an organizational form would surely render the
league a single entity and would remove its activities from the purview of
section 1.7 0 The prohibition on conspiratorial behavior therefore would
not apply, and there would be no section 1 theory to sustain the result in
Los Angeles Coliseum. But the basic complaint concerning the league's
failure to fully develop the Los Angeles market would remain. There
would still be concerns that a potentially significant consumer demand
was unmet and, if one adopts the majority's reasoning, that those fans
who were able to see live NFL performances were paying excessive prices
for their tickets.
What this example does, of course, is approximate the situation that
would exist if the majority had developed a more consistent view of the
league's interest in cooperative behavior. There does not appear to be a
significant potential for greater market penetration resulting from truly
competitive behavior, because the league would not be required to cause
clubs to compete against one another. And in single franchise cities,
there is not likely to be any competition at all. The outcomes here are
similar to those that would obtain if the league were organized as a
wholly-integrated entity. Hence, while there may be a complaint about
market penetration, it is not a complaint that necessarily draws signifi69. Noll suggests that leagues maintain a scarcity of franchises in order to enhance the value of
existing teams. Such scarcity also gives clubs increased bargaining power in dealing with stadiums.
See Noll, Alternatives in Sports Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 17,
at 411, 412. From the perspective of public policy, scarcity also serves ends that may be regarded by
some as less ignoble. Noll accepts that playing quality is higher if franchises are limited; further, the
availability of alternative sites serves a legitimate business objective by preserving some locations as
potential home sites for existing franchises that encounter financial difficulty. Id.
70. The duality requirement of section 1 is treated in the text accompanying notes 12-14.
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cance from the concerns for inter-entity competition under section 1.71
As suggested, even under the rule of Los Angeles Coliseum, competition
is not assured. Perhaps then the real objection is to the monopolist-like
behavior that the league engages in with respect to market development. 72 Such an objection has a decided section 2 ring to it.
Other sources elaborate the relevant section 2 concerns. 73 A full
factual investigation of the development of the NFL could well reveal the
presence of colorable section 2 claims. But the factual inquiry would
have to show more than that the NFL possessed monopoly power. Under
section 2 monopolies are not automatically condemned. 74 The essence of
section 2 regulation is a finding that market power has been misused, in
particular that it has been used improperly to acquire a monopoly position or to extend it.75 That is a question worth investigating. The objection, though, is not one that a fellow cartel member, such as the Raiders
club, should be allowed to raise. 76 Moreover, such a complaint requires a
factual record different from that developed in Los Angeles Coliseum.
Another very distinct possibility is that the matter of franchise allocation requires a legislative solution. It appears that normal market
forces will not insure that an optimal number of franchises will be established. Such market imperfections frequently provide the justification for
regulation. A particular attraction of a legislative response is its capacity
to avoid the narrowness of the Los Angeles Coliseum case. That decision
considered only the issue of franchise relocation and left unaddressed the
closely related issue of league expansion. In addition, the particular legal
theory used in the case does not allow for participation by all interested
parties. Among those who might have wished to be heard are the disap71. This analysis is also germane to another point that has arisen in the debate over the antitrust status of sports leagues. It is occasionally suggested that a finding that a league is a single
entity would effectively exempt the league from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 8,
at 368 (statement of William R. Robertson, Commissioner, Los Angeles Coliseum Comm'n) ("effect
of declaring the NFL to be a single entity would be to bestow on the NFL absolute carte blanche to
disregard the antitrust laws"). However, as the text here suggests, that is not correct. While the
single entity characterization would preclude further inquiry under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
section 2 and all other antitrust provisions would be wholly applicable.
72. Professor Quirk, in his excellent study of franchise movements, concluded that the problem
of unresponsive league decisions was a product of the monopoly characteristics of the league. See
Quirk, supra note 35, at 64-65. His doubts about the capacity of the marketplace to provide the
necessary corrective are consistent with the theme of this article.
73. See, e.g., E. GELLHORN, supra note 13, at 84-139; L. SULLIVAN, supranote 13, at §§ 19-58;
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 687-92, 705-33.
74. See, e.g., 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 614-623 (1978); E. GELLHORN, supranote 13, at 112; see also United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708
(1927); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
75. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 714-24.
76. Id. at 702-05.
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pointed Oakland fans, other potential purchasers of a new Los Angeles
club, and other potential recipient cities of a relocated Oakland franchise.
The legislative forum offers an attractive opportunity for a broadened
perspective.
There is, though, more that can be said about Los Angeles Coliseum
as a section 1 case. Specifically, there is a question as to which of two
explanations provides the most appropriate response to the section 1 issues that are raised. The absence of any prospect of a significant increase
in intraleague competition can be taken to mean that the league behavior
in question does not violate section 1. There may be differing views,
however, as to how this conclusion is to be reached. From one perspective, the error of the case is in the majority's rule of reason analysis. It
could be contended that the league's franchise controls were procompetitive in that they furthered the cooperative nature of the league's venture
and enhanced its economic stability vis-a-vis other entertainment products. 77 Conversely, significant limitations on the league members' joint
control over market penetration would impede the league's ability to respond to the dictates of its inherent economic interdependence and impair the output of its joint product. An alternative view is that the rule of
reason issue need not be reached. From this perspective the court erred
in its basic characterization of the nature of the defendant league, at least
with respect to franchising decisions. Specifically, the court's treatment
of the single entity issue would be disputed.
Each of these views is considered below. They are not, however,
dramatically different conceptions. A point not fully recognized in the
literature considering antitrust issues in the sports industry is that the
single entity theory and a rule of reason analysis sympathetic to the need
for internal league controls are variations on the same theme. 78 The
unifying concept is the economic interdependence of the league participants and their need for cooperative decisionmaking. The premise of the
single entity theory is that the degree of interrelationship is so extensive
that league participants can fairly be said to be co-venturers pursuing a
common end. If the league participants had chosen to organize themselves as a corporation or formal partnership and ceded ultimate authority to the agreed-upon entity, there would be complete singularity and
little justification for demanding internal competitive behavior. Lesser
degrees of economic integration shade the antitrust characterization.
There are few guidelines to help a court deal with the many gradations
77. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2967-68 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Glick, supra note 17, at 59-60 (attempting to distinguish single entity theory of
professional sports leagues from the joint venture theory).
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that are likely to occur. 79 But presumably we must be prepared to accept
that some organizational forms less formal than a traditional corporation
or partnership may remain beyond the ambit of section 1.80
79. A common form of analysis offered by opponents of the single entity theory tracks the
following format. The league says it should be treated like a partnership. But it is clear that the
league is not a partnership. This is evidenced by the fact that league members do not share profits
and losses and that each retains control over basic decisions of strategy and managerial policy. Because the league is not a partnership, its claim of single entity status should be rejected. See, e.g.,
Hearings,supra note 8, at 369-71 (testimony of William R. Robertson, Commissioner, Los Angeles
Coliseum Commission); id. at 405 (statement of Moses Lasky, Esq.,) ("Anyone with [a] minimum of
legal education knows that the essential element of a partnership is the sharing of profits and losses
and the joint ownership of assets. The 28 clubs in the NFL are not joint owners of the assets of the
clubs and they do not share profits.") See also Glick, supra note 17, at 59-60.
A careful review of the origins of the single entity theory in the sports cases indicates that
application of the theory does not depend on a finding that the leagues are actually partnerships.
Rather the contention is that the economic interdependency of leagues makes them loosely analogous to other types of entities that fall outside section 1. See, e.g., J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra
note 12, at 699-701.
Subsequent portions of this article give attention to the details of the NFL's structure which
weigh both for and against the proposed analogy. See infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
80. The various professional leagues differ in the extent to which there is a sharing of revenues
and a centralization of authority. Some features of the NBA, for example, involve distinctive partnership-like characteristics. There are now significant league-wide salary controls intended to limit
the ability of teams to pursue their individual prerogatives in hiring players. An attempt has been
made to equalize salary expenditures across the league so that clubs in weaker franchise locations
spend roughly the same amount for players as those in lucrative markets. Although the present
system admits of a number of exceptions, a cap on total salary expenditures is intended to remedy
the imbalance that previously existed between strong and weak franchises. By the same token,
though, a rule mandating a salary floor not far below the cap is intended to promote an equalized
competition by requiring weaker franchises to pay salaries comparable to those of wealthier teams.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983, § 5, at 2, col. 1; id. Apr. 1, 1983, at A19, cols. 1 & 5. Because of
the floor, some franchises will be committed to a minimum salary budget well in excess of their
ability to operate profitably on the basis of their individual receipts. Consequently, there is a plan for
significant cross subsidization between clubs. Stronger clubs, in effect, will share profits with weaker
ones and do so for the purpose of maintaining good opponents. See, e.g., id., Apr. 1, 1983, at A19,
col. 5. The NFL would likely contend that it has chosen a different array of devices-particularly
the equal sharing of lucrative television contracts-to achieve the ends sought by the NBA.
The NBA's equalization effort should increase the extent to which the league's co-venturers
involve themselves in the management of individual franchises. If fellow owners provide significant
financial subsidies to a club, they will likely not be indifferent about how the club is run. If the
subsidized club makes foolish decisions in selecting players and setting salaries, some mechanism for
oversight and intervention by other clubs will likely be devised. See Scorecard,SPORTS ILLUS., Apr.
11, 1983, at 13.
A question left substantially unexplored in Los Angeles Coliseum is the extent to which the
clubs within the NFL have retained the authority to supervise the operation of individual franchises.
As is discussed below, the majority assumed that the NFL clubs were highly autonomous in their
managerial prerogatives. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. Such a view, however, fails
to give sufficient weight to the role of league rules in controlling managerial decisions that are disruptive of the league members' common interests. In addition, there is an inadequate accounting of
the residual authority of the league to correct the misguided policies of an individual club. See infra
note 125-33 and accompanying text.
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At some still lower level of formal integration, the league's decisionmaking becomes subject to section 1 review but is saved from condemnation by a rule of reason justification based on the close intertwining of the
participants' interests. In these cases, the compelling feature again is the
cooperative character of the venture. Condemnation under section 1 is
inappropriate because its premise of fostering competitive and unilateral
behavior is inapplicable. As in the case of a fully-integrated venture,
joint actions necessary to the success of the enterprise are not only pro81
tected but encouraged.
The choice between the rule of reason and the single entity theory as
the basis for correcting the result in Los Angeles Coliseum is thus a choice
of degree and not of kind. If the facts pertaining to the NFL's internal
operation show a significant degree of economic integration, then the single entity characterization would be appropriate. But even if one were
not persuaded of the completeness of the participants' interrelationship,
the rule of reason would still allow significant cooperative decisions to be
removed from antitrust condemnation. In either event, there are aspects
of each theory that warrant further attention.
IV.

REASSESSING THE SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF REASON REVIEW

What are the defects in the majority's rule of reason analysis? One
error has already been indicated in a general way. The majority uses
language suggesting that it believes competition will be enhanced if
league controls are restrained. But' the majority also gives recognition to
league interests that make it doubtful that true competition between
clubs will result. Thus there is an inherent muddling in the court's analysis. A more carefully reasoned appraisal would accept that a choice has
to be made between the divergent approaches. And if the correct choice
is made, the inherent noncompetitive character of internal league relationships will be given the predominant weight.
This approach is quite consistent with the general mandate that the
rule of reason be used only to promote procompetitive outcomes.8 2 The
Los Angeles Coliseum court is prepared to concede that the league can
take steps to avoid serious competition between two franchises in a
shared city8 3 and presumably must accept that there will be only a single
81. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961-62 (1984) (NCAA regulations enhance competition among members and enable a product to be marketed which might otherwise be
unavailable).
82. See, e.g., National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978);
see also supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussion of rule of reason).
83. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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franchise in most cities.8 4 With the prospect of interclub competition
virtually eliminated, it is not obvious that significant procompetitive virtues have been furthered by the decision. Indeed, any serious effort at
listing those virtues would reveal the misdirected nature of the task.
Moreover, there is a strong argument to be made that giving the

league discretion to allocate its franchises is itself procompetitive. Control of franchise location is part of the league's larger effort at effective
market development. Viewed in this light, the controls are essentially
enterprise-enhancing.
This is very close to an argument about the ancillarity of the
league's restraint that was made by the league but apparently not fully
understood by the court. 85 The venerable case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 86
upholding a covenant not to compete by a seller of a business, provides
the appropriate reference. While the covenant by definition limited competition at one level, it had a substantial, procompetitive justification. In
the words of the Supreme Court in a recent passage specifically approv-

ing Mitchel v. Reynolds, the restriction had "the long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business-and thereby providing
incentives to develop such an enterprise. ' 87 Not every occasion for competition need be forced upon entrepreneurs. Enhancement of the basic
enterprise is a proper goal. 88 Thus, while owners of professional sports
clubs would be competitors in some other types of industry structures (as
with barnstorming teams), an authorization for cooperation enables a
particular version of sports activity-a structured league race culminating in a national championship-to take place. 89 A venture occurs that
might not otherwise be possible and thus its internal controls are
procompetitive.
84. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
85. See Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395. The majority reasons that an ancillary restraint, like any other, must be weighed in the procompetitive-anticompetitive balance. Thus, for the
majority, the argument for ancillarity adds little, if anything, to the rule of reason. A different view
is that ancillarity authorizes a court to focus on the nature of the enterprise being undertaken and
ask how the particular restraint affects that enterprise in its efforts to compete against others. The
majority's analysis places its primary emphases on intra, as opposed to interenterprise effects. See
Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ABA SEc. OF ANTITRUST L. REP. 211, 233
(1959) ("[tlhe concept of business competition may be irrelevant as applied to the relationship between members of a league").
86. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K. B. 1711).
87. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
88. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979); see also Bork, supra note 85, at 211.
89. For a further discussion of the distinctive features of a centrally-controlled league competition, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 736-37.
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There is another perspective that should serve to underscore that
franchise controls are necessary to maintain proper enterprise incentives
and thus are enterprise-enhancing. The essential point is that the opportunity being allocated in a franchise decision is one that was created by
the joint contributions of the co-venturers in the league and its disposition should be a matter of collective entrepreneurial prerogative. Especially important is a recognition of the right of the group to both secure a
fair return for the opportunity relinquished and control the disposition of
the resulting rewards. Without careful preservation of the co-venturers'
interests in these matters, the incentives for the type of cooperative behavior essential to a league will be substantially diminished, if not destroyed. As Mitchel v. Reynolds suggests, the rule of reason does not
require that legitimate business transactions be foregone.
This was the essential point of the hypothetical at the beginning of
this article. The first part of the problem asked if the league would be
permitted to charge a fair market value franchise fee to an outsider who
purchased the right to operate the second Los Angeles team. Because the
asset being sold is the product of the league members' collective effort,
the answer presumably would be "yes." 90 By contrast, though, the Los
Angeles Coliseum case seems to hold that the same extraordinary opportunity must be given away free to an insider bold enough to claim it.
The justification for this result is hardly clear. Indeed, what seems
more sound is the notion that in a franchised business, the acquisition of
a franchise does not give an automatic and preemptive right to claim
important corporate opportunities. The analogy that comes to mind involves a different organizational form but still seems apt for exploring the
question of who can claim enterprise assets. Assume that X purchases a
McDonald's franchise and that the franchise operates on Locust Street in
a Midwestern city. The franchise is quite successful over a several-year
period. But then the state decides to build a limited access expressway
that will siphon a good deal of the traffic off of Locust Street. In addi90. The debate over a somewhat analogous issue is pertinent here. Congress has given attention
to the question of whether there ought not be more freedom of entry for new franchises in the major
leagues. One proponent of freer entry, Representative Seiberling, recognized, however, that the presence of revenue-sharing opportunities creates a significant risk that free-riders will claim these revenue opportunities without making proportionate return contributions. See Hearings,supra note 8, at
73-74 (statement of Rep. Seiberling). Because the corporate entity-the league-has made the right
to share revenues valuable, it would seem that it should be allowed to receive a fair return if the right
is diminished. See id. at 73 (testimony of Professor Gerald Scully). But if the "price" charged for
the relinquished right approximates its present discounted value, it is likely that new entry will be
deterred. See id. at 73 (testimony of Professor John C. Weistart).
This analysis is relevant to the present issue because franchise moves involve the appropriation
of another form of corporate opportunity. If a valuable franchise location is relinquished by the
league, presumably it can raise a similar claim to compensation.
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tion, there will be no access from the expressway anywhere near the McDonald's outlet.
X is disturbed. He calculates that he can operate at a profit, but just
barely. But then he hears that marketing surveys have indicated that the
popularity of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina is such that a McDonald's
franchise located on Ocean Boulevard in that city will be wildly successful. Must X be given the Myrtle Beach location?
That would be a surprising result. The more correct view is that
when X accepted his franchise, he accepted an array of risks and limitations. X surely has some right to make adjustments to improve his business, and, of course, the franchiser will want him to. It is quite another
matter, however, to suggest that X has the right to claim, cost free, the
best corporate opportunity available at the particular time.
Some might suggest that the answer is not that the league can deny
the franchise to the insider, but that the insider can be charged a fair
price. If the analysis is taken to that point, there probably is relatively
little controversy remaining. Once it is conceded that the co-venturers in
the league can charge for a relinquished corporate opportunity, the inside
suitor is likely to be discouraged. In effect, the insider would have to pay
a double franchise fee, first at its initial entry and then later upon its
relocation. A credit might be given for the franchise that was relinquished, but this is not a certain offset. In many locales, an operating
franchise will be considerably more valuable than one that must start
afresh. 91 Moreover, the opportunity in the former location may be
92
quickly lost to a competing venture.
In terms of the rule of reason, the suggestion being made here is that
the restraint involved in a league's control of the movements of existing
91. The value of the franchise opportunity in the insider's former city will likely be further
diminished if the insider has already departed. Local fans are likely to view the move as an affront
and may well be reluctant to embrace a new entrant. See supra note 25.
92. The movement of NFL franchises from Oakland and Baltimore was followed by the efforts
of USFL clubs to establish themselves in these cities. The USFL presumably was attracted to the
two markets because of their proven ability to support professional football clubs. On the other
hand, both markets are small and the presence of a USFL club, even one that is only modestly
successful, may mean that a new NFL club could not establish itself. If this was the outcome, the
departing NFL club should receive no credit for the location it relinquished.
This analysis suggests a subsidiary point that would become important if the majority's analysis
prevailed. A league ought to be empowered to provide for an orderly movement of franchises and
thus, under some circumstances, should be able to insist that a club's prior location not be abandoned until a new entrant is found. The period of delay could be substantial, but delay seems to be
warranted if the corporate entity is allowed to protect the value of its locations.
Moreover, it might be noted that it is not a significant additional step to conclude that the
disgruntled owner should be required to relinquish ownership of his team in exchange for the right
to purchase a new team in the new location. Such an outcome promotes league stability and satisfies
the interests of fans in both the old and new location. See supra note 29.
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franchises should be seen as enterprise enhancing. Just as a former
owner's agreement not to compete preserves the value of a business being
sold, league control of franchise opportunity creates business assets that
can be auctioned and sold to the benefit of all participants of the venture. 93 Some choices of individual participants are deterred, but such a
result is necessary if the other venturers are to have proper incentives to
contribute to the careful development of the league's business.
The error of the majority's decision in Los Angeles Coliseum is in its
assumption about the nature of the economic opportunity that is being
claimed. An unstated premise of the case seems to be that the new
franchise location is an open-market opportunity that may be claimed by
the first entrepreneur-or more precisely, but less rationally, by the first
entrepreneur with an existing franchise-who has the wherewithal to expropriate it. This approach misses the critical point about where, how,
and at whose effort the opportunity arose. There is much more involved
than simply the right to operate a professional football franchise in
southern California. The opportunity to be claimed includes a right to
identify with the NFL, to partake of its carefully nurtured preferred position among football fans, and to share in the considerable rewards of
internal revenue-sharing. The proprietary nature of the opportunity
should be apparent.
V.

A

CRITICAL LOOK AT THE MAJORITY'S SINGLE ENTITY

ANALYSIS

The persistent undercurrent in this analysis is that a sports league is
a shared venture. While there is some room for individual creativity and
impulse, the most successful leagues are those in which cooperation and
common control predominate. The question naturally arises as to
whether a sports league-in its franchising decisions specifically, or in its
economic function generally-is not more appropriately treated as a unitary entity that lacks capacity to transgress the prohibitions of section 1.
Application of a single entity characterization would be a recognition
that-at least as to some important functions-a league operates with
such economic interdependence that it should be allowed to enjoy the
economic freedom afforded other more traditional collections of capital,
such as partnerships and corporations.
The majority in Los Angeles Coliseum was not unmindful of the single entity theory. Indeed, it addressed the issue squarely on both legal
and factual grounds. 94 A close review of its analysis, however, suggests
93. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
94. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387-90.
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that it did not adequately refute the appropriateness of treating the
-league as a unitary entity. Indeed, the weaknesses in the court's attempted refutation serve only to reinforce the claim that the premises of
section 1 do not apply to the activity involved in franchise location
decisions.
The majority's analysis in Los Angeles Coliseum focuses on three
justifications advanced by the district court for rejecting the single entity
characterization. Each point of analysis is accepted by the majority.
First, it is reasoned that a logical extension of the "single entity" argument would remove all league actions from section 1 scrutiny, but precedent, especially from the player restraint cases, is to the contrary. 95
Second, in the view of the majority, other organizations "just as unitary"
as a sports league have been found to violate section 1.96 Finally, it is
contended that the argument in favor of treating the league as a single
entity proceeded from a "false premise": 97 that individual clubs have no
value apart from their participation in the NFL. To the contrary, the
majority held that "each team [is] an entity in large part distinct from the
NFL."98
A.

The Independent Value of a Franchise.

We will first review the last point, which requires the closest consideration of the factual aspects of a league's operation. The majority accepted the assertion of the district court that NFL clubs are "separate
business entities whose products have an independent value." 99 This
statement appears to contain conclusions on two different contentions:
first, that as business entities individual clubs have economic characteristics sufficiently distinct and pervasive to warrant their separate treatment
in the present controversy; and second, that the clubs produce products
that are distinct and separable. We will treat these contentions in turn.
The majority's assertion about the independent value of the product
of each NFL club appears to be based on a factual assumption that is at
least highly debatable and probably erroneous. The district court criticized the NFL's argument for single entity status by suggesting that it
included an erroneous assumption "that each club can produce football
games only as an NFL member." 1°° In the view of the district court,
"[t]here is no conceptual reason why any NFL club could not decide to
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1388.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1389 (quoting Los Angeles Coliseum, 519 F. Supp. at 584).
Los Angeles Coliseum, 519 F. Supp. at 584 (emphasis in original).
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pull out and join a new league."' 0 1 On appeal, the majority embraced
this analysis and. extended it with the indirect suggestion that the independent value of an NFL club is proven by the fact that any NFL club
could move to the rival United States Football League. 0 2 Despite the
agreement of the two courts on this point, it is far from clear that the
owner of an NFL club could simply shift his players over to a rival
league. And indeed if he could not-if the players could remain with the
NFL-then the contention concerning a club's independent value weakens greatly, and perhaps dissipates entirely.
The doubtful premise of the courts' assertion is most clearly revealed if one asks whether a player under contract to an NFL club could
object if the owner decided to switch leagues. Both courts apparently
assume that the player has a contractual relationship only with the club
and if the club is prepared to fulfill the terms of its promises, then the
player must deliver his return performance even if in a different league.
This assumption skips over a number of potentially critical points. At a
general level, it can be observed that players frequently are not indifferent
to where and for whom they play. A player may choose to play with the
NFL because it has much more extensive television coverage, or because
it plays during the traditional fall season, or simply because it is the more
established professional league. Presumably, an actress who signed a
contract to play the lead in My FairLady could not be compelled to
appear in Oh! Calcutta! instead, even if the salary were the same. The
traditional concern for respecting the expectations of the contracting parties would similarly suggest that a club's right to make a unilateral shift
03
in its league affiliation is not a foregone conclusion.
101. Id.
102. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
103. The role of the law in insuring respect for the expectations of the parties is expressed in
several different contract doctrines. In general, a party cannot be made to perform a contract different from that which he signed. Thus, contracts will be interpreted to have that meaning which is
consistent with the intent of the parties at the time of signing, and it is that understanding that will
be enforced. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 532-545 (1960). Moreover, the failure of
the other side to deliver the return opportunity that was promised is usually a ground for termination. See 4 A. CORBIN, supra, at §§ 943-946; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 241-242
(1981).
In addition, efforts to transfer contract rights to another party or another setting can be resisted
if the change will increase the promissor's risk, burdens, or opportunities. See 4 A. CORmN, supra,
at §§ 865-868. See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 291-98. While a true impossibility of performance or a substantial commercial frustration may alter the promisee's duty to deliver
further performance, the law falls far short of embracing any notion that a change in perceived
advantage allows the promisee to demand performance on different terms. Rather, the typical remedy where exigency arises is a termination of the agreement. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra, at §§ 13531361; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-272 (1981).
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The NFL player will have other objections of a more specific nature.
Most important are those that involve changes in the players' actual and
potential compensation. An NFL player rightfully assumes that his participation in the league-funded pension plan is part of his compensation
package. °4 Indeed, an appraisal of the employee's rights that did not
include this benefit would be critically incomplete. An owner's action
terminating the player's rights under the league plan raises the serious
prospect that the player would be excused from his own performance
under the playing contract. 105 In the same vein, most players would not
lightly remove themselves from the provision of the NFL collective bargaining agreement specifying the minimum gross amount that league
clubs will collectively spend on salaries.10 6 This provision was a major
10 7
point in the settlement of the bitter 1982 strike by the players' union.
Presumably individual players perceived that they would benefit by the
guarantee that is provided.
This analysis could be carried through a variety of other terms in
the documents governing the player's employment relationship, including those pertaining to player mobility, injury dispute resolution, and
limitations on club-imposed discipline. 10 8 That examination would reveal that each player develops substantial links with the NFL, and these
acquire a status that is presumably entitled to protection under traditional contracts principles. It is important to emphasize what this analysis reveals. It appears that players are not highly mobile producers who
can be switched between leagues at the sole discretion of an owner. Indeed, quite the opposite is suggested. Even though a player signs with
Recent writings in the law of contracts have renewed the concern for insuring that a contracting
party receives the subjective value he sought from his contract. This emphasis on subjective value
adds weight to the basic point made in the text. See Kronman, Specific Performance,45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 351, 354-76 (1978); Muris, The Costs of Freely GrantingSpecific Performance, 1982 DUKE L.J.
1053, 1054-55; Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 274 (1979).
104. Under the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NFL clubs agreed to pay some $62.5
million to the Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan. The collective agreement also designated how
benefits credits would be earned under the plan and specified the amount of disability payments to be
made to a player. NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT Art. XXXIV, §§ 2, 8(a)(d) (1982).
105. A club's material breach of its contract normally excuses the obligation of the player to
render the return performance. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 279-82.
106. The clubs gave their guarantee that they would pay at least $1.28 billion in player salaries
for the four seasons between 1983 and 1986. Specific amounts are guaranteed for each season. If
club expenditures in the four years do not reach the designated levels, the owner's Management
Council is obligated to pay the players the balance according to a "downs-played" formula to be
agreed upon by the union and management. NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT app. G (1982).
107. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at 27, col. 4; id., Nov. 21, 1983, at E5, col. 4.
108. NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT arts. XV, IX & VI.
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the Los Angeles club or the Houston club, he develops deep and perhaps
intractable links with the larger league that are entitled to legal respect.
Of equal importance is the fact that the ties between players and the
league are neither haphazard nor incidental. Rather, they are specific
manifestations of the commonality of the economic venture to which
players attach themselves.109 Affiliation with this league rather than another is a partial reflection of the player's assessment of the league's success in marketing its joint product. Similarly, the player's appraisal of
such important concerns as the league's short-term financial security and
its ability to weather future market shifts may well be affected by how the
league has accommodated its need for internal cooperation.
The majority's third justification for rejecting the single entity theory also rests on the fact that NFL clubs are maintained and operated as
separate businesses. Each has different owners, each follows different
management philosophies, and each has different levels of profitability.
The league suggested that the importance of the clubs' separate corporate
structures is diminished by the extensive revenue-sharing between clubs.
This element, however, was insufficient to change the majority's basic
view of the relationship among clubs: "[a]lthough a large portion of
league revenue, approximately 90%, is divided equally among the teams,
profits and losses are not shared, a feature common to partnerships or
other 'single entities.' "110
The issue of how to treat the separateness of the various clubs within
a league is not an easy one. The reasoning followed by the court has a
certain cogency to it. There is, however, a literalness to the majority's
analysis which is not required by existing precedents and which masks
more subtle features of a sports league that are critical to the legal characterization. It is literally true that each club is separate, but it is also
true that the partners in an accounting firm or law firm are separate legal
109. The analysis in the text focuses on claims that a player might raise to resist his transfer to
another league. It can be noted that other league clubs may also have a right to object to such an
attempted transfer. Another team may assert that any claim that the employer has to the player's
services is contingent on those services being used in furtherance of the league enterprise. Such an
argument has considerable force where the departing employer acquired its rights to the player in a
recent league draft. Other clubs can properly assert that the draft was intended only to allocate
negotiation rights for internal league purposes. Although other clubs refrained from negotiating
with the player after the departing employer won its draft rights, they did so on the critical assumption that they would indirectly benefit from the increased on-the-field competition that would result
from the player's remaining in the league. When that assumption is frustrated by the employee's
threatened departure, other clubs should be allowed to insist that rights to the player be reassigned
within the league according to a new draft or waiver procedure. Because the player typically consents in advance to intraleague assignments, his contract would be protected upon any other club's
agreeing to pay the promised salary.
110. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.

Vol. 1984:1013]

THE NATURE OF A LEAGUE

1049

beings for some purposes. And the court is correct that net profits and
net losses are not literally shared. But it is quite another matter to suggest that each NFL club is entirely responsible for its own profitability.
Finally, while it is true that each club has management responsibilities
and that the excitement generated by the league is frequently a product
of the diverse management styles adopted by the franchises, it may not be
correct to suggest that each club is a separate managerial entity. The
league in fact reserves to itself extensive prerogatives, and in the final
analysis these may well supersede the preferences of any individual
league participant.'11
It should be clear from existing precedents that the separate legal
status of the participants in an economic venture does not preclude the
possibility that their cooperative enterprise will be treated as a single unit
for antitrust purposes. The concept here is as fundamental as the theory
of the firm. Once we move to any enterprise more complex than a sole
proprietorship, we are likely to find that there are multiple participants.
Indeed, corporations, partnerships, and business trusts are frequently devices through which otherwise independent actors join their capital. Participants in such ventures need not relinquish their separate identities in
order for their cooperative activities to be treated as a unitary venture
t2
under the antitrust laws."
A curious feature of the majority opinion in Los Angeles Coliseum is
the absence of an effective response to the major argument made in favor
of treating a sports league as a single actor in its franchise decisionsthat the league has many characteristics of a partnership, at least in its
franchising decisions.' 13 The partnership analogy reveals the limitations
of the majority's emphasis on literalism. Partners in a partnership may
111. See Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1
of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. RE,. 1, 27-35
(1983).
112. An argument has been made that if co-venturers accepted "the manifold legal, tax and
business advantages of separate incorporation," then they should not be treated as a single entity for
antitrust purposes. See Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity" Defense
Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 217, 226 (1982). This view is clearly
rejected in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2741-44 (1984).
Numerous authorities support the general notion that a partnership with corporate partners is
valid. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 2, 6, U.L.A. 12-13, 22 (1974); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 179 (1979); Armstrong, Can Corporations be Partners?, 20 Bus.
LAWYER 899, 899-900 (1965). Presumably, such an entity would also be recognized for antitrust
purposes.
113. An analogy developed elsewhere is that which compares the league to a nationwide accounting partnership seeking to establish branch offices. If the firm rewards its partners on the basis
of their individual productivity, it shares an important characteristic of a sports league. A refusal by
the firm to authorize a branch office may limit a partner's economic advantage. It is not clear,
though, that such a decision transgresses any important antitrust policies. See J. WEISTART & C.
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take different legal forms; corporations can be partners of sole proprietors, for example. In addition, there may be a differentiated sharing of
the rewards of the partnership venture, including an arrangement that
compensates participants on the basis of their respective productivity and
skill in executing the partnership task. Finally, the partnership need not
exercise actual day-to-day control over the actions of the partners. Individual creativity and initiative can be encouraged. Indeed, in general
partnership law, what ultimately seems to be important is the potential
the actual confor joint control that is reserved by the partnership,1 not
14
trol that is exercised over the constituent members.
There is a good deal of value in avoiding literalism in the analysis of
this issue. It is true that a sports league is not literally a partnership.
And the analogy to a partnership cannot be applied four square. But the
critical question is whether the sports league is sufficiently like a partnership to partake of the legal treatment afforded such an entity.1 15 Apart
from mere assertion, the court's opinion makes no significant effort to
establish the respects in which the subsidiary points of the partnership
analogy are in error.
Certain aspects of the operation of a sports league warrant particular attention in this context. One is the matter of revenue-sharing. The
court asserted that, while the vast majority of revenues are shared, profits
and losses are not. This assertion, however, fails to fully recognize the
economic effect of the league's cooperative behavior. Take the case of the
NFL franchise that has turned in poor on-the-field performances for two
or three years-readers can supply their own examples from among the
several notorious instances that have occurred in recent years. Such a
team has little television appeal, and its television exposure is often limited. But how much of the total NFL television revenues are paid to this
unproductive club? By agreement of the NFL clubs, the poorly performing member receives an equal share.11 6 And who "earned" most of this
revenue? Of course it is earned by the clubs that are more exciting and
generate the substantial television audiences. In effect, then, "profits"
attributable to the efforts of more productive members are directly
shared with clubs that are making negative contributions. This same
phenomenon can be viewed as a sharing of losses. If the club with a poor
LOWELL, supranote 12, at 699-702. See also Grauer, supra note 11I, at 2-7; Rothenberg & Telleon,
Restraints on ProfessionalAthletes, 4 L.A. LAW. 35 (1981).
114. See, e.g., H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 112, at §§ 13-15, 23, 184, 187, 194195.
115. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
116. For a more detailed explanation of the division of television receipts within the NFL, see
Hearings,supra note 8, at 253-56 (written response of NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle to questions
from Representative Rodino, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary).
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performance were entitled only to revenues that it generated solely
through its own performance, it would likely produce a balance sheet
loss, for even as successful as the NFL has been in general, fans have not
shown themselves to be inclined to make losers separately profitable. But
within the league, what would otherwise be operating losses often become profits because of an infusion of shared receipts.
When the focus of the analysis is broadened to include other forms
of cooperative behavior, the significance of the majority's emphasis on
the separate status of each team is further diluted. For example, the
sharing of gate receipts dulls considerably any suggestion that individual
clubs capture the rewards of skillful management and promotion of their
specific team. Who benefits from a successful local advertising campaign
that fills a cavernous stadium? With a 60-40 revenue split, the beneficiaries include all teams who visit there. And who benefits if a perceptive
management makes a mediocre team competitive? Again, the division of
gate and television receipts insures that the rewards of adeptness are not
hoarded.
Frequently overlooked is the fact that many operational rules of the
league are actually devices for sharing risks and wealth. Properly
viewed, a system for allocating new talent by a draft is largely a method
to provide cross subsidization between clubs.1 17 Wealthier, more successful teams that would otherwise have a superior opportunity to sign
the best new talent forego that right and, through the device of the
league's draft rules, reallocate these important assets to less successful
franchises. The subsidy, if successful, will avoid the recurrence of negative operating revenues for a weak franchise. The draft rights even become a crude form of money when they are included as part of a larger
trade package.1 18 Thus, the subsidy may be cashable immediately and
affect the seller's balance sheet in a very tangible way. The rewards of
success are not as highly individualized as the court suggests, and intraleague sharing has a significant effect on relative profitability.
The majority opinion may have also moved too quickly through the
question of the degree of managerial prerogative retained by individual
117. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 544-45, 594-95.
118. Indeed, economists have complained about this cross-subsidization aspect of player restraints. It was contended that the traditional restraints denied to players the opportunity to receive
their fair market value in contract negotiations. Once a club obtained rights to a player, it could sell
the contract to another club and claim to itself the difference between the player's contract salary
and his free market price. See H. DEMMERT, supra note 17, at 31-39; Canes, The Social Benefits of
Restrictions on Team Quality, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 17, at 81;
Quirk & El Horidi, The Economic Theory of a Sports League, in id. at 33. In most leagues, recent

changes in the player restraint arrangements have diminished significantly the contract-market price
differential.
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clubs. In the court's view, "[t]he disparity in profits [among clubs] can
be attributed to independent management policies regarding coaches,
players, management personnel, ticket prices, concessions, luxury box
seats, as well as franchise location . ... " 119 As just noted, however, the
league has already made a significant decision which refutes any suggestion that astute franchise managers are allowed to capture all of the economic rewards of their actions. The league has decided that the returns
from successful local management, both those returns coming through
the gate and those that result from television appearances, must be
shared. It is true that the producers of the successful teams generally
receive the greatest rewards, but this is not wholly different from the
typical professional partnership which gives recognition to individual
productivity. There is therefore some uncertainty as to exactly what the
court uncovered with its observation about a disparity in profits. Did it
discover the ingredient that proves the separateness of individual clubs,
or did it merely see the consequences of an internal reward system of a
firm that wants to insure that the incentives for success are not muted?
To answer this question, the majority should have carefully assessed
the range of potential managerial control that the league has reserved to
itself. Interestingly, the opinion is silent on this critical question. Indeed, as presented, there is a question-begging quality to the majority's
analysis: it is suggested that the task before us is to ascertain how the
antitrust laws will affect league decisionmaking; that depends in part on
the nature of the entity we have before us; that will be defined in part by
the degree of control that the league can exercise over management policies; but that, of course, is precisely the question that we set out to answer. The majority's opinion heartedly embraces this circularity when it
suggests that "individual management policies regarding . . . franchise
location" 120 are evidence that the entities involved are sufficiently independent to require close antitrust scrutiny of their collective actions,
including league decisions on franchise location. But whether a club can
claim such independence is precisely the issue at hand.
It would seem preferable to start with an assessment of the managerial prerogatives that leagues-that is, league members acting collectively-have reserved to themselves. That should tell us a good deal
about how closely a league comes to replicating the characteristics of a
single firm. On that point, other antitrust precedents seem to make clear
that unitary action may be found even when individual components are
119. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
120. Id.
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left to conduct their day-to-day affairs free from centralized control.12 1
The critical ingredient seems to be not the completeness of actual con22
trol, but rather the potential for ultimate control by a dominant unit.1
In the case of a sports league, that potential for league control has
historically been presumed to be virtually complete. Members of a
league acting collectively have assumed that they had authority to determine the location of league franchises, how these franchises will be
owned, the broadcasting arrangements that the league will pursue, how
revenues will be divided, and even the terms upon which clubs contract
with players. 23 A consideration of the types of decisions that could have
been made, but were not, underscores this point. Could the NFL have
left the home team with only forty percent of the gate receipts rather
than sixty percent? 24 Could the league have included a buy-out provision to rid its franchises of incompetent management? Again, absent the
"rule" first announced in the instant case, the answer was assumed to be
"yes." And the reason for this was the economic interdependence of the
actors within the league. There are very good business reasons why a
league's clubs have a keen interest in the management of individual
franchises and the manner in which revenues are divided.
The prospect of wide-ranging, and indeed ultimate, league control
rests on more than mere assertion. One would want to think carefully
about the significance of Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhnt25 before embracing the majority's claims as to the sanctity of the management decisions of individual club owners. Finley's Oakland A's had won the
World Series in 1972, 1973 and 1974. In 1976, Finley conducted the
sports equivalent of a liquidation sale: he arranged to sell or trade the
contracts of several star players.' 26 The reason for the action was somewhat in dispute, but the effect was unmistakable-a team that had prevailed in the carefully structured league competition was being
121.

See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2733 (1984).

122. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984), the Supreme
Court reversed prior precedent and held that a parent corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary
were incapable of engaging in a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court did not
think that the degree of actual day-to-day control exercised by the parent was determinative: "They
share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary; the parent
may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests." Id.
at 2742.
123. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
124. Cf NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2974 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that the majority does not limit the NCAA's right to force revenue sharing). It should also be noted
that the NBA has apparently assumed that it has the right to go beyond a mere sharing of gate
receipts to require gross subsidies between teams. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
125. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
126. See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
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dismembered. The Commissioner of baseball blocked the action under a
provision of the league constitution that empowered him to prevent actions detrimental to the best interests of baseball. 27 The Commissioner
was, of course, exercising power that had been delegated by the various

league participants.
Under the division of authority assumed by the majority in Los An-

geles Coliseum, the Oakland baseball franchise might be thought to have
the right to set "independent management policies regarding . . . players."128 The courts that reviewed Finley's complaints about the Com-

missioner's interference, however, disagreed, and the league's assertion of
authority was upheld. The case is interesting for the present discussion

because it avoids the inherent circularity of the antitrust analysis in Los
Angeles Coliseum. Because baseball, at least in the activities in question

129
in Charles0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, is exempt from the antitrust laws,

the analysis proceeded on other private and public law bases. 130 In the

end, however, no legal principle was found that limited this exercise of
centralized league control. Even though the managerial decision being
countered involved players directly under contract with the plaintiff's

club, and even though the decision was intimately involved in the local
owner's efforts to maximize his economic advantage, the exercise of ultimate control by the league was found to be proper.' 3 ' Other decisions
involving the baseball Commissioner's authority to discipline league
clubs and their owners are similarly expansive. 32 There are few hints of
127. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, art. 1, § 2: "[t]he functions of the Commissioner shall be
. . .to investigate. . . any act, transaction or practice . . . not in the best interests of the national
game of Baseball" and "to determine . . . what preventive, remedial, or punitive action is
appropriate."
128. The quoted language is from Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
129. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
130. Plaintiff Finley's complaint asserted seven different causes of action, ranging from improper
interference with contract to a denial of constitutional due process and equal protection. See Charles
0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 531.
131. The Commissioner gave three reasons for his action. Two are particularly germane to the
present discussion because they are unmistakably founded on the notion that the league has general
collective interests that transcend the right of the club to manage its players, even though player
contracts are assets that the club ostensibly owns separately. Commissioner Kuhn asserted that the
sale of the star players would not only debilitate the Oakland franchise, but would also upset the
competitive balance within the league by further strengthening already affluent clubs. Hence, in the
league's view, it had an ongoing interest in the relationship between the Oakland club and its fans.
In addition, the club's control of the players affected the economic interests of other owners. Again,
the fact that the club "owned" the player's contracts was not regarded as a sufficient reason to give
the club control of their disposition. See Charles 0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 531. The court
indicated that it found ample authority for the power that was exercised. Id. at 538-39.
132. See, e.g., Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-17
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (upholding then Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's suspension of Atlanta Braves owner
Ted Turner for violating Major League Rules as well as provisions of the collective bargaining agree-

Vol. 1984:1013]

THE NATURE OF A LEAGUE

1055

the sort of pervasive local powers that are declared to exist by the majority in Los Angeles Coliseum.
Again, the problem here seems to be one of the proper characterization to be applied to observed facts. The majority observed that some
individual prerogatives were exercised by the separate NFL clubs and
that these decisions had a differential impact on economic return. This
led the majority to conclude that the clubs were separate entities. A
deeper probing, however, would have cast doubt on this conclusion. It is
true that individual effort is rewarded in the NFL and that the league
product is attractive because clubs make separate strategic judgments on
the development of their product.1 33 But there is much more to the nature of the league's operation. League members have historically ceded
significant authority to their collective instrumentality. There are actual
examples of broad exercises of league authority and legal bases to support claims of rather pervasive retained but unexercised prerogatives. It
is these powers that should provide the perspective for assessing the discretion that individual franchises exercise. When this assessment is made,
the integrated, cooperative character of the league's operation is difficult
to dismiss.
B.

Other Entities "Just as Unitary."

The Los Angeles Coliseum court's analysis of the antitrust treatment
afforded other cooperative entities reveals additional significant flaws in
the majority's reasoning. A second justification advanced by the court
for denying the league's single entity analogy is that other entities "just
as unitary" have been found to violate the antitrust laws.134 It is at this
juncture that the opinion makes its most earnest effort to bring its rejection of the single entity argument within the ambit of major Supreme
Court precedents. The majority's primary analytical tool is the analogy:
it asserts that the economic organization of the NFL is like that of other
entities whose susceptability to section 1 review has been established by
the Supreme Court. Several cases are cited, but the court relies most
ment with the players); Milwaukee American Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 300 (N.D. I11. 1931)
(upholding Commissioner's action of disapproving an option contract between the St. Louis and
Milwaukee baseball clubs). See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 315-18.
133. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982), explicitly recognized that the practice of separate
ownership of franchises has a substantial marketing justification. Such ownership was seen as "desirable in order to convince the public of the honesty of the competition." The court went on to
note, however, that a somewhat contradictory goal-relative equality of playing strength among
competing clubs-must also be achieved. Id.

134. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1388 (quoting Los Angeles Coliseum, 519 F. Supp. at
583).
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heavily on Associated Press v. United States 135 and United States v. Sealy,
Inc.136 However, a critical examination calls into question the appropriateness of using these precedents.
As has already been noted, a central point in the league's claim of
unitary status is that cooperation is a necessity and economic interdependency a reality. Indeed, most observers accept that no single team can
produce a football game, and no single team can be indifferent about the
quality of its competition.137 In addition, the economic fortunes of one
team can be greatly affected by those of other league members. 3 8 Since
franchising decisions can have a significant effect on the financial return
of both the individual club and the league in general, they are an important, and sometimes critical, mechanism for insuring that economic relationships remain in balance. The majority in Los Angeles Coliseum
makes the bold assertion that in other settings the necessity of cooperation has not precluded the application of section 1.139 The majority then
mentions Associated Press and states that in Associated Press "the
Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the AP was immune from section 1 because it was a necessary cooperative of independent newspapers
'
which produced a product its individual members could not. 140
There is a fundamental difficulty with this characterization. The
need for cooperation in Associated Press is quite different from that
claimed by a sports league. The Associated Press is a collection of newspapers that gather news in their respective local markets and feed the
stories into a national network where they are used by other member
papers. The cooperative effort thus enables relatively small local papers
to cover events from across the nation. It would be very expensive for
individual papers to provide nationwide coverage, and for many the cost
would be prohibitive. This fact led concurring Justice Frankfurter, but
not the full majority of the Supreme Court, to say the AP gathered and
distributed news items that the individual members "cannot collect sin14
gle-handed, and which require their pooled resources."'
But this pooling is "required" in a much different sense than is the
sharing involved in the operation of a football league. In Associated
Press, no one contended that it was economically impossible for a single
paper to have a national news network or that the financial fortunes of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

326 U.S. 1 (1945).
388 U.S. 350 (1967).
See supra notes 17 & 62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1389.

140. Id.

141. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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the various providers were irrevocably tied together. Indeed, later developments in the newspaper industry have established that expansive coverage by a single publisher is quite possible.1 42 Hence, the collective
effort of the Associated Press was largely a device to make newsgathering
more convenient. The claim of clubs within a sports league, however, is
a claim of true necessity. No product can result without cooperation,and perhaps more to the point, the entities involved are inherently interdependent in a financial sense.143 While newsgatherers can be relatively
indifferent as to whether their fellow venturers are poor or wealthy, effi142. USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and to some extent The New York Times provide
useful contrasts to the system offered by the Associated Press.
143. It is important to note that there is a difference between the need for cooperation on the one
hand, and financial interdependence on the other. The Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), bears the seeds of significant potential confusion on this point. In
characterizing the NCAA, the Court draws an analogy to a sports league. Id. at 2960-61. The
Court identifies the inherent need for cooperation in setting schedules and defining rules of play as
reasons why a rule of reason analysis, rather than a per se approach, is appropriate for analyzing the
antitrust status of both sports groups. The Court also notes that the participants have a common
interest in promoting their sports product.
It is true that professional sports leagues, the NCAA, and other sports associations such as the
Professional Golfers Association are similar in the extent to which they must cooperate to produce
and promote their respective products. Subsequent footnote references in the NCAA opinion, however, suggest that the majority believes that the NCAA and a professional sports league are legally
analogous in other respects as well. Id. at 2961 n.24, 2962 n.28, 2964 n.35. There is an implication
that the NCAA opinion provides the framework for analyzing the antitrust problems of league organizations. This approach fails to take account of the feature that provides a critical distinction
between the two types of governing entities-the financial interdependence of the participants. As
suggested in this article, such interdependence is a fundamental feature of a professional sports
league that operates a traditional unified sports competition. Contrary to the implications of the
NCAA decision, however, there is not economic interdependence among NCAA teams. The number
of entrants is so large-even within Division I-that worthy opponents will emerge without crosssubsidization. In short, good teams can find lively competition even without having to finance it. In
addition, there are forces in college sports that deter the stockpiling of talent by a few teams and
insure a relatively constant redistribution of promising incoming players. The rules limiting eligibility to four years and those which, in effect, standardize the amount of aid that can be paid, operate to
permit the athletic fortunes of teams to change over time. This is quite unlike the situation that
exists in a professional sports league where there is a danger that a team could otherwise hoard
talent, and where the ability to do so varies significantly based on the relative profitability of
franchise locations. See J. WEIsTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 595-97. In the league setting,
clubs have found it necessary to adopt equalizing devices, such as revenue sharing plans, mobility
restraints, and the like.
The difference between a governance structure based on cooperation and one based on interdependence is quite important for antitrust purposes. The need for cooperation may only serve to
move such a structure within the rule of reason and provide a potential justification to be examined.
True economic interdependence, however, changes the basic character of the organization. As suggested in later paragraphs, see infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text, a group of actors that is
truly interdependent and that operates in an integrated fashion begins to look like a separate firm,
the type of entity whose governance decisions fall outside the scope of section 1.
The difference between a venture that is interdependent and one that is merely cooperative
apparently was not fully settled in the Los Angeles Coliseum case. In their brief opposing the NFL's
petition for certiorari, the Raiders gave the following appraisal:
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cient or mismanaged, these are fundamental concerns to a group of clubs

seeking to maximize fan interest in both individual events and championship games. Thus, Associated Press seems to have involved an issue-

collective action undertaken for economic convenience-that does not
arise in the sports context.
The court also placed considerable reliance on United States v.

Sealy, Inc. t44 Indeed, the majority stated that it perceived the case to be
"closely on point."'' 45 Sealy involved something of a joint venture. Because the Supreme Court found the organization to be subject to the anti-

trust laws, the clear implication for the Los Angeles Coliseum majority is
that the Supreme Court would reach a similar conclusion were it to ex-

amine the relationship of the clubs within the NFL. Once again, though,
there are weaknesses in the attempted analogy.

Sealy involved the cooperative use of a leading brand name in bedding. The Sealy company owned the right to the Sealy name and licensed its use by various manufacturers. Although at one time it was
independently owned, the Sealy company eventually came to be owned
and controlled by the respective licensees. The licensees encountered an-

titrust difficulties when they agreed to abide by exclusive territorial allocations. The Supreme Court affirmed that these attempted market

divisions were illegal.
There are two problems with the use of this case by the majority in
Los Angeles Coliseum. The majority fails to acknowledge the contro-

versy surrounding the Sealy decision. There is authority for the view
that Sealy proceeds from a faulty economic premise to the extent that it
raises impediments to the licensees' successful marketing of the Sealy
NFL paints the individual characteristics of the professional sports business as different from a variety of other businesses. Its argument both starts and ends with the premise
that there is a significance of a sports 'league.' [sic] The premise has never been disputed.
Professional football is a species of business in which numerous separate entities engage,
each for profit, and by the nature of the business the clubs must play each other. To the
end of arranging the games and administering the playing against each other, cooperative
action is necessary. The significance of a league is that it is the apparatus to administer the
playing of games. Within that context andfor that limited purpose, agreement and cooperation can be reasonable. But insofar as cooperative action infringes upon the freedom of
competition, the law is violated.
Brief of Respondent Los Angeles Raiders in Opposition to Petition of National Football League for
Writ of Certiorari at 9, National Football League v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
397 (1984) (emphasis in original). The perspective expressed here is considerably different from that
taken by most commentators. Most authorities have seen a need for interaction among clubs that
extends well beyond "arranging the games and administering the playing against each other." See
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
144. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
145. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1389.
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brand in competition with other brands of bedding. 146 There is doubt
about whether the decision can be read expansively, especially in an era
when a reconstituted Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to evaluate substance and minimize organizational form in antitrust analysis.147
48
At a minimum, the case hardly warrants an unqualified application.'
In addition, there are grounds to doubt the attempted analogy between the Sealy arrangement and a professional sports league. The point
here is that made with reference to Associated Press.149 The arrangement
among the licensees in Sealy may have been convenient, but it can hardly
be said to have been the product of necessity. Notably lacking was any
substantial basis to suggest that the bedding manufacturers endured an
unavoidable economic interdependence.1 50 Indeed, the opposite seems to
have been true. Beyond a minimal level of profitability that assured adequate product quality and market saturation, the relative fortunes and
efficiencies of the respective participants were not a concern. In fact, the
demise of some co-participants might actually have been welcomed as
this would leave a demand for Sealy bedding that others could satisfy. It
is quite conceivable that some licensees harbored secret plans to gain
control of the brand, realizing that no principle of economics would require the indefinite joint production of Sealy bedding.' 5 1
In the end, the majority's second reason for rejecting the single entity argument fails. The difficulty is that the attempted analogies are
stretched too far. While we do find Supreme Court cases that consider
cooperative ventures, it is not true that the entities involved are "just as
unitary." In fact, the arguments made by a sports league are unique and
146. See, e.g., Liebler, Book Review, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1317, 1333-41 (1978). See also E.
GELLHORN, supra note 13, at 187-88.
147. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2741-42 (1984).
148. The Supreme Court's more recent Broadcast Music and NCAA decisions would seem to
require that an inquiry be made as to whether the restraints in Sealy could be justified as enterpriseenhancing. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961-62 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979).
149. 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
150. The difference between the sports industry and the setting of the Sealy case is suggested by
public policy issues that have appeared in the sports context. For example, it has been proposed that
revenue sharing among clubs should be compelled by statute. See Noll, Alternatives in Sports Policy,
in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 17, at 411, 414. Such a provision, mandating a minimum 70-30 split of gate proceeds, was endorsed by the Senate Judiciary Committee in
its recommendations for legislation to govern the merger between the NBA and the American Basketball Association (ABA). See S. REP. No. 1151, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1972); see also Carlson,
The Business of ProfessionalSports: A Reexamination in Progress, 18 N.Y.L.F. 915, 931 (1973).
Such proposals have as their premise that cross-subsidization is essential for the efficient operation of
a sports league. It is quite unlikely, however, that a similar contention could be successfully put
forth in the Sealy context.
151. Further elaboration on the differences between the production of sports products and other
commodities and services can be found in J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 39, at 19-25.
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require a much more careful probing of the dividing line in antitrust law
between unitary and conspiratorial activity.
C. A True "Entity" Exemption?
The majority's argument that treating the league as a single entity
would place the league beyond the reach of section 1 prompts a useful
question about the nature of the single entity defense itself: is it a doctrine that can only immunize "entities" for antitrust purposes, or is it an
expression of antitrust policy that can be applied to selected entity activity? The majority, however, saw no reason to search for great subtlety in
the league's contention that it was analogous to a partnership and should
be so treated for antitrust purposes. For the majority, the proffered argument could be quickly rejected because, carried to its logical extreme, it
would produce an absurd result. The result that the majority in Los Angeles Coliseum seeks to eschew is the complete immunization of the NFL
from section 1 liability. In the court's view, not only would this be absurd, it is also fanciful, for several different courts have found section 1
violations in other NFL rules. The principal cases mentioned by the
court are Kapp v. NationalFootballLeague,15 2 Mackey v. National Foot54 all decisions striking
ball League,1 53 and Smith v. Pro Football,1Inc.,1
55
down various restraints on player mobility.
There is a great plausibility in the court's reasoning on this point.
The proffered defense is, after all, one that inquires into the general nature of the entity and it is one that seeks to classify the entity's status
under the antitrust laws. If the entity is found to be outside the concerns
of section 1, then presumably it is free of those strictures in all of its
functions. Stated another way, a partnership is a partnership. If we decide that the league is in fact a collective entity, then presumably that
characterization should apply in hiring decisions, marketing decisions, or
internal agreements to divide revenue. On the other hand, if in other
cases we have found that the accumulation of capital retained a basic
duality, then that characterization ought to apply over a range of
1 56
activities.
152. 390 F. Supp. 73, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affid, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 907 (1979).
153. 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
154. 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
155. These cases are discussed in J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 603-17 & Supp.
156. This seems to have been the approach taken by North American Soccer League v. National
Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir. 1982). But see Mid-South Grizzlies v. National
Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (while purporting not to decide single entity
question, court allows league to exercise partnership-like control of membership), aff'd on other
grounds, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
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There is, however, another view. The single entity defense can properly be used less as a gauge for pigeonholing entities and more as a means
of expressing the policy conclusion that in certain unusual accumulations
of capital, some basic business decisions ought to be removed from antitrust scrutiny because the relationships involved are close to those that
earn antitrust immunity in more traditional settings. The difference is
one between the court's assumption that single entity status must be
earned by a top-to-bottom integration of the firm in question, and the
view that entity-like behavior-when premised on economic necessityis sufficient to call forth the policies that prompt the different treatment
of separate entities.15 7 In appraising the second view, it is relevant to ask
whether there are any principled divisions that can be established to confine the reach of the single entity analogy. The majority's concern, of
course, is that there are not. Yet, its opinion does relatively little probing
of the point.
Some potential limitations do suggest themselves, and it does not
seem inevitable that a sports league would be treated as a single entity for
all decisions that it makes in connection with its operation. One could
imagine, for example, that the antitrust liability of the league might vary
depending on whether the clubs involved were buying uniforms, assigning players, or allocating franchises. It should be clear that the clubs
within a league involve themselves in a variety of different markets and
take actions which affect third parties who have varying degrees of closeness to the league's management. The contrast between suppliers of
uniforms, players, and fellow club owners is suggestive of the range of
activities that might be examined. Such an analysis was an important
part of the appraisal offered by the dissenting opinion in Los Angeles Coliseum. Judge Williams perceived that a rough distinction could be
drawn between the league's end product, or "downstream output," and
its inputs or "upstream flow. ' ' 158 The former is its product of professional football and the latter is its relationship with players and other
suppliers. For Judge Williams, there was no problem of unintended results because again, there was a point at which a principled distinction
could be drawn to confine the implications of the single entity theory. 159
The real concern underlying the search for the limits of the single
entity analogy seems to be that discussed earlier-the question of the
extent to which clubs within a league can be viewed as competitors. The
majority thought that it perceived a significant potential for competition
157. Those policies are discussed infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
158. Los Angeles Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1406 (Williams, J., dissenting).
159. See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 12, at 702.
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between the Raiders and the Rams. One who believes this to be so is
likely to be skeptical about any contention that these "competitors"
should really be treated as one entity. But as previously suggested, the
court may have made a fundamental error in its assumptions about increased competition. The local competition that may occur will hardly
be robust and, indeed, if business planning were a science, would not
occur at all. 1 60 In addition, the majority's premise fails to deal with the
fact that most members of the league compete with neither the Raiders
nor the Rams, and most face no serious prospect of competition from
another NFL club because they are located in single-team cities. 16 1
A different view of intraleague "competition" provides the basis for
reasoning back to the nature of the entity behavior involved. If the essential ingredients of the activity-here protecting corporate opportunities,
controlling errant economic impulses, and developing a national market-are mainly related to the cooperative, noncompetitive characteristics of the league, then it seems appropriate to afford the venture the
same range for creativity that is enjoyed by traditional entities with similar attributes. In other functions the league will be treated differently.
The claim of an inherent cooperative character will not always be available. But where the league is functioning as an integrated unit, its unitary nature should be both respected and encouraged.
The issue of how literally to apply the single entity concept is somewhat clarified by developments with respect to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine that occurred after Los Angeles Coliseum. The majority
in Los Angeles Coliseum used its concern for the breadth of immunity
that the single entity defense would impart as the occasion to discuss the
law applicable to intra-enterprise conspiracies. The majority drew some
support for its rejection of the NFL's single entity defense from Supreme
Court decisions that held that separately incorporated entities could violate section 1 even if they were commonly owned and controlled. The
majority's implicit point was that if a wholly-owned subsidiary is to be
treated as a separate entity for section 1 purposes, then surely the constituent clubs of a league, which had even more clearly discernible characteristics of independence, should not be treated more favorably. Four
months after the Los Angeles Coliseum opinion was issued, the Supreme
Court repudiated the traditional intra-enterprise doctrine in Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.162 and overturned the precedents on
which it was based. The Court specifically held that a parent corporation
160. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
162. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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and its wholly-owned subsidiary lacked the requisite duality to justify
application of section 1 prohibitions. The force of the point made by the
majority in Los Angeles Coliseum is thereby lost. More important, however, are the implications of the rationale used by the Supreme Court in
Copperweld.
Copperweld contains an interesting essay on why the antitrust laws
draw such a sharp distinction between "'concerted and independent action.' "163 The former is treated under section 1, while the latter is the
object of section 2's concern for monopolization. And, in the words of
the Court, "concerted activity subject to [section] 1 is judged more
sternly than unilateral activity under [section] 2."164 The reason for
treating concerted activity under a more exacting standard is that such
behavior "deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes." 165 On the other hand, section 2
is more lenient because it seeks to encourage creativity and prerogative. 166 In short, legal restraints on single firm activity are purposely
drawn more narrowly in order to allow the actor maximum opportunity
to find his market advantage.
In elaborating on the evils of conspiracies, the Copperweld Court
uses various phrases that further suggest the state of affairs subject to
condemnation under section 1. For example, the Court notes that in improper conspiracies there is a joinder by entities "that previously purused
their own interests separately."' 167 In addition, the Court on at least
three occasions suggests that conspiracies represent a "sudden joining
together" of otherwise independent economic forces.1 68 The concept embodied in this phrase also partially explains why joint action between a
parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary should be viewed as
not involving a section 1 conspiracy. In that case, "there is no sudden
joining of economic resources that had previously served different
1 69
interests."
The concept that is conveyed has relevance for a professional sports
league. The clubs within a league never were wholly independent actors.
And there is no "sudden joining" of interests that previously were separate. Indeed, the process through which sports leagues are formed is in163. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct.
1464, 1469 (1984)).
164. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
165. Id. at 2741.
166. Id. at 2740.
167. Id. at 2741.
168. Id. at 2741-42.
169. Id. at 2742.

1064

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1984:1013

structive. In modern times at least, sports leagues are not the product of
a conspiratorial joining of barnstorming clubs. Rather, the league and its
basic constituent clubs are born together. 170 The simultaneous formation
is essential, for the product being purveyed is not simply professional
football, but rather a league race involving contests among clubs with
competitive strengths that have been rendered roughly comparable by
prior design. Typically, then, the option available to the marketplace is
not league activity versus independent teams, but rather league activity
versus having these same resources devoted to some nonfootball venture.
Viewed in this light, the formation of the league is not a venture that has
the net effect of depriving consumers of the benefit of independent cen7
ters of competition.1 1
It does not require a great deal of subtlety to see that once again the
underlying issue is the extent to which it is desirable or efficient to demand interclub competition for franchise location. The problem with the
early intra-enterprise conspiracy cases was that they assumed that any
increase in competition would be desirable, even if it occurred between
two components irrevocably bound up in a common economic venture.
Copperweld's reversal of the basic doctrine should serve to renew the
point that not all justifications premised on supposed increases in the
number of competitors will be persuasive. What is required is a more
discerning analysis that considers the nature of the economic venture involved and allows integrated actors freedom to choose the manner in
which they will compete.
VI.

WHICH THEORY?

An underlying theme of this article is that we must find an antitrust
theory that more appropriately characterizes the franchising decisions of
sports leagues. Under either of the alternative theories we have considered, Los Angeles Coliseum would be reversed, and the NFL would be
permitted to prevent the Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. But the
choice of the theory is hardly a matter of indifference. A variety of subsidiary issues turn upon the characterization that is given.
The forces favoring the use of a substantive, but favorable, section 1
rule of reason review are strong. Judicially created immunity in the anti170. The USFL is the most recent example, although the formation of other leagues in the past
fifteen years-for example, the ABA, the WFL, and the WHA-follow the same pattern.
171. The precursor to the sports league was a haphazard collection of barnstorming clubsindependent centers of competition, if you will. By one account, the consequences of barnstorming
were so unsatisfactory for both owners and fans that the formation of a league with centralized
control-and restraints on competitive impulses-was an economic necessity. See Voight, The Boston Red Stockings: The Birth of Major League Baseball, 43 NEw ENG. Q. 531 (1970).
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trust area is not favored. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expended a
good deal of energy in the last fifteen years striking down an array of real
and supposed immunity grants that the courts had developed in earlier
periods. 72 The Court now frequently intimates that those who seek special dispensation should petition Congress. 173
Another appeal of the rule of reason theory is that it allows for a
case-by-case and issue-by-issue parceling of liability. Even if the
franchise restrictions were allowed in the present case, the issue of league
controls would never be placed beyond judicial scrutiny. 174 Judicial
oversight will continue, and where facts change or abuses are perceived,
there remains a vehicle for a reassertion of public control. Finally, approval of the NFL's practice under the rule of reason does not represent
a radical departure from the treatment of other unusual economic entities. The suggestion that executing a single entity-like function is enough
to avoid section 1 is considerably less conventional. Formulators of judicial policy might be concerned that the unleashing of such a novel concept should be avoided where there is a plausible alternative. This more
conservative approach avoids a potentially long stream of cases in which
creative advocates try to show that the activities of their clients are entity-like and thus beyond section 1 scrutiny.
172. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Comment, The Anatomy of JudicialExemptionsfrom
Antitrust: A Study in Gap-Filling, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 813 (1969); see also Note, Antitrust Liability
of ProfessionalAssociationsAfter Goldfarb: Reformulating the Learned Professions' Exemption in the
Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1047.
173. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90
(1978).
174. There is considerable disagreement, nevertheless, about how useful the rule of reason is as a
device for achieving reliable, consistent results in sports antitrust cases. This is pointedly reflected in
testimony given by various partisans in 1981-82 congressional hearings on the antitrust status of the
NFL and other leagues. William R. Robertson, a commissioner of the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission, testified that "the rule of reason is designed precisely to permit judges and juries to mold
antitrust standards to fit the particular circumstances of each case. . . . The rule of reason is a
highly flexible concept which provides the NFL with ample opportunity to justify its claimed right
to extraordinary treatment." Hearings,supra note 8, at 370-71.
This contrasts with the view advanced by NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle:
[E]ven when courts undertake to identify the league relationship and recognize its uniqueness, the courts have no standards for determining what the unique relationship means for
antitrust analysis. The range of factors deemed relevant or irrelevant in the resulting analysis covers the entire spectrum and has been stated in contradictory fashion by different
courts.

...

• . . [E]ach of the following factors has been dismissed as not being meaningful for
purposes of "rule of reason" analysis: considerations of "fan loyalty," league "goodwill,"
league "stability," "common sense," "necessity" as an element of successful league operations, the entertainment qualities of the league's product, and playing field balance.
Id. at 216-17, 230-31.
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It appears to be correct that the rule of reason represents the softer
landing in the present context. But such a choice holds a decided risk of
subverting some critical considerations. In a general sense, these considerations touch on the question of how exacting a level of judicial oversight of league affairs should be encouraged. There is a case to be made
that the league is entitled to operate with minimal controls under section
1, at least insofar as its marketing policies are concerned.
An important premise of this view is the one developed at length
earlier.17 5 In marketing its product, the league operates with many of the
characteristics of an economically-integrated business. And despite some
trappings of a collection of separate businesses, many of the internal incentives are the same as those found in business forms clearly outside the
coverage of section 1. The fact that the co-venturers have different net
returns is not controlling, for the arrangement does not differ substantially from techniques used by integrated businesses to reward those who
make unusual contributions to the success of the overall enterprise.
If we find that the league in fact functions with a high degree of
integration, there is then reason to be concerned about the extent of judicial regulation that section 1 will impose. Copperweld indicates rather
pointedly that the different treatment of integrated and collusive ventures
under the antitrust laws is not the product of haphazard policy planning.176 There are desirable goals to be achieved by giving an integrated
entity considerable latitude to determine how it will develop and market
its product. Among other things, there is a potential for greater innovation and creativity than in a venture that is subjected to persistent judicial second-guessing. In addition, the role of the courts is placed in a
more appropriate perspective. The judiciary will continue to be vigilant
as far as market abuses are concerned. But the vehicle for oversight is
the concern for improper monopolization. 177 The primary goal of this
type of enforcement is to insure that the competitive opportunities of
outsiders are not improperly deterred. Avoided is the situation in which
courts are called on to mediate what are essentially internal disputes
about the distribution of the rewards of the entity's activity. Such cases
are typified by a lack of substantial effect on the competitiveness of the
relevant market, and a substantive diversion of the entity's attention
away from its primary goals. The instant case may provide a significant
example of the limited benefits that consumers will enjoy as a result of an
175. See supra notes 110-33 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
177. The potential relevance of section 2 of the Sherman Act is discussed supra notes 67-76 and
accompanying text.
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attempted judicial mediation of an internal entity dispute.1 78
The courts' inclination to search for less restrictive alternatives
under section 1 underscores the risk that an improper application of that
section will stifle the operation of truly integrated firms. A premise of
the concern for least restrictive restraints is that the rulemaker should
operate with great care and precision in structuring its control. Under
this approach, it is difficult to deal with situations that present unusual
complexities or in which factual premises are highly uncertain. A later
investigation may well reveal that there is a considerably less restrictive
way in which the desired end could be achieved. The doctrine seems
destined to favor caution over creativity and procedural elongation over
quick adaptive behavior. Such a result is markedly at odds with the goal
of encouraging flexibility and innovation.
Perhaps more to the point, there is little that is gained by this process of judicial accounting. When applied to nonintegrated actors, the
admonition to draw restraints carefully has the effect of expanding the
competitive opportunities of at least some participants. But as has been
suggested, in the context of sports leagues, it is most doubtful that individual co-venturers will make a lasting contribution to general levels of
competition. If the other participants within the league are allowed to
pursue their legitimate interest in sharing and cooperation, these errant,
selfish impulses will be contained by various techniques.
A final point is of a more intuitive nature. The rule of reason invites
a type of inquiry that courts have had difficulty making accurately and
efficiently in the sports industry. Very seldom is the economic complexity of the industry thoroughly understood.179 Nor have courts been par178. An earlier portion of this paper doubted whether the Los Angeles Coliseum decision will
provide increased competition and expand consumer choice. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
Noticeably absent from the court's discussion is any gauge of the extent to which competition in
the San Francisco-Oakland market was injured as a result of the league's inability to compel the
Raiders to remain there. Indeed, when the Raiders' move from Oakland to Los Angeles is considered in connection with the Colts' move from Baltimore to Indianapolis, it is difficult to be confident
that consumers benefited overall. Fans in at least two cities were significantly disappointed by these
outcomes.
179. The district court in Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn.
1975), affid in part & remanded, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), offers an example of the difficulties
sometimes encountered in judicial appraisals of the economics of professional sports. Despite an
extensive trial and a transcript of over 11,000 pages, the court concluded: (1) that "freedom of
employment" of players would not affect the quality of play in the NFL; (2) even if "the quality of
play would decrease," that fact would not justify a restraint on mobility; and (3) the NFL player
restraints had not furthered competitive balance in the league. Id. at 1008. The court of appeals
carefully avoided endorsing these statements and instead conceded the need for some type of equalization device. The court did disapprove the particular restraint before it as being overly broad. 543
F.2d at 621-22. As suggested elsewhere in this article, the need for equalization is now generally
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ticularly successful in explaining the seemingly contradictory incentives
180
for intense athletic competition and pervasive economic cooperation.
Nor has there been a truly serious effort to assess the extent to which the
apparent individuality of clubs-both athletic and economic-is primarily a marketing device that masks a more basic spirit of cooperation.1 8 1
Certainly the Los Angeles Coliseum case leaves a long trail of uncertainty.
Is the NFL really analogous to the Associated Press? Is it true that an

NFL owner is free to reassign his players to a new USFL franchise? Is it
true that there is no profit-sharing in the NFL television contract, gate

receipt arrangement, and player allocation rules? In the face of massive
revenue-sharing, can it seriously be maintained that individual club own-

ers capture all rewards of astute managerial decisions?
The problem of dealing with limitations in the nature of the judicial
institution is not unique to the sports industry. There are other settings
in which the structure of traditional litigation and the unavailability of
support personnel limit a court's understanding of the general context

out of which a problem arises.1 82 Perhaps it is true that in most settings
this situation should simply be accepted, or at least not shade the nature
of substantive review. The present problem may be different, however.
We are considering a choice between alternative theories that, if properly
applied, should not produce wholly disparate results. Thus, we are assuming that the choice of a rule is not a choice between competing outcomes. In this context, it seems proper to consider the relative accuracy
accepted, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, and there is no substantial disagreement that
restraints on player mobility are an acceptable means of achieving this end. The fact that each of the
unions representing players in the major professional leagues has consented to some type of restraint
is instructive on this point.
180. A case that presents a particularly confused view of the nature of a sports league is Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court concludes that the special economic
needs of the NFL allow it to avoid per se condemnation and calls for a rule of reason review. Id. at
1180. But the court then appears to refuse to consider these needs in making its substantive rule of
reason analysis. The court finds that the need for playing strength balance on the athletic field is not
procompetitive and should not be taken into account. Id. at 1186. In a later passage, however, the
court seems to reverse itself yet again when it suggests that more mild versions of the draft would be
acceptable under the rule of reason. Id. at 1188-89.
There is a growing body of opinion that the rule of reason analysis in that case is seriously
flawed. See, e.g., Memorandum from Arnold & Porter to Commissioner of Baseball Re: Problems
That Would Arise in Applying the Rule of Reason to Baseball's Practices and Institutions (Feb. 22,
1982) reprinted in Hearings,supra note 8, at 439-45; Grauer, supra note 11, at 39-40; Robinson,
Recent Developments-1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1980) ("there is something drastically
wrong with a methodology that, after reviewing with painstaking care the purpose, history, and
effect of a practice, . . . totally ignores those reasons in deciding whether the self same practice
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade").
181. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: JudicialSupervision of PublicInstitutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1307.
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and efficiency of the decisionmaking process. Even accepting that the
entity analogy has some imperfectly defined edges, its use would have the
effect of forestalling a series of inquiries that have proven themselves to
be diversionary in the past.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The process of scrutinizing the majority's single entity analysis and
rethinking its rule of reason appraisal should serve to underscore a very
basic criticism of Los Angeles Coliseum: the prospect for interclub competition that the court believes is the lynchpin of its analysis is wholly
inadequate to support the broadscale reform that it seeks to launch. The
vast majority of clubs in the NFL-or in any other league, for that matter-will never engage in serious economic competition. Moreover, the
characteristics of club structure that the majority believes will provide
the seeds for intraleague competition-separate managerial control and
ultimate financial responsibility-may in fact be manifestations of something considerably different from fundamental independence. The
residual authority of the league appears to be quite vast and may include
a right to so restrict league relationships as to remove all opportunity and
perhaps all incentives for separate action by individual clubs. A mandate
for a complete pooling of revenues and expenses would produce that
18 3
result.
The majority uses the catchwords that would seem to bring its analysis in line with prevailing antitrust goals. It decries "monopoly prices;"
it says it is striking a blow for increased competition; it alludes to the free
market model of commercial behavior. At the same time, however, it
embraces other notions that are more than mild qualifications on these
premises. The concessions that the league has an interest in the financial
stability of its constituent members and that competitive balance on the
athletic field is important set up irreconcilable conflicts among the
court's purported policy goals. It appears that the court would strongly
prefer not to have to make a choice between the two competing concerns.
Indeed, in the majority's opinion the tension that results from the meeting of these two forces is never expressly resolved, nor even addressed.
The notions of the desirability of internal competition and the league's
interest in financial equalization are kept well apart.
The alternative perspective proposed here is one that gives more
credence to the corporate nature of the league venture. Valuable
franchise locations hardly resemble open-market opportunities to be
plucked by the first available entrepreneur. Many entities, including
183. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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clubs located in distant cities, have contributed to the value of these opportunities. It seems quite natural that those who create the important
asset should have the right to share in the fruits of this collective effort.
Even individual athletic contests between two clubs have strong corporate overtones. The majority seems clearly wrong in suggesting that each
individual club offers a separate product. A club playing itself is-not very
exciting. Nor is there much excitement in that same club playing a random group of opponents of uncertain and uneven quality. Of a clearly
different magnitude is the athletic encounter between clubs whose talents
have meaning for some larger purpose beyond the immediate outcome.
But it is, of course, the league-the corporate entity-that provides the
occasion for that larger significance, and it is the league's nurturing that
has produced the fans' relative preference for this league's product over
other competing versions. More pointedly, USFL football is not NFL
football, and games involving a team called the Raiders are not equally
exciting in each league.
The preference expressed in this piece is one that encourages corporate innovation at the level of the most relevant entity. The periodic
judgments that need to be made about how best to shape and promote
the NFL product are not of a sort amenable to the objectification called
for by the court's approach. There will, however, still be a need for continued judicial oversight. The tendencies toward monopolization are unmistakable in the various professional sports. But these concerns for
innovation and oversight can be accommodated. Other provisions of the
antitrust laws suggest such a vehicle. In the alternative regime envisaged
here, internal divisiveness will be discouraged, or at least not encouraged.
There will, nevertheless, be an antitrust accounting, but one that looks at
ends rather than means.

